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Abstract
During the late 1980s, globalization of the world's economies and technological
development created the conditions for the expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
in telecommunications. This tendency has been further boosted by different economic
reforms that countries have implemented, which have included the liberalization of FDI
regimes and the opening of the infrastructure sectors, including telecommunications, to
private investment and competition. As a result, developing countries have received
considerable inflows of FDI in telecommunications through multinational companies,
headquartered in developed countries that either have purchased state-owned telecom
providers or have entered mobile markets. In this context, since the late 1990s a few
domestic companies from emerging economies have also emerged as successful players
in the international markets, generating a new wave of investment, commonly called
"South-South" FDI, that currently represents nearly one-third of foreign capital inflows in
telecommunications in developing economies.
This thesis explores the country-level drivers of the recent wave of South-South FDI in
telecommunications and how these drivers have shaped domestic companies' competitive
advantages. Specifically, I address two research objectives: First, to determine what
country-level factors have enabled a few domestic companies from developing countries
to emerge as successful players in the international telecommunications markets. Second,
to identify the role governments have played in the rise of this type of investment. Using
economic and regulatory information on 145 developing countries I built a cross-section
econometric model of the determinants of this wave of FDI during the period 1998-2007.
The results indicate that multinational telecommunications companies from developing
economies tend to originate in relatively large countries with maturing
telecommunications markets. These companies' operations tend to be located in nearby
countries whose markets exhibit large potential, where they find favored access
conditions and where they are able to exploit their superior knowledge of emerging
markets. Also, these companies are more likely to emerge in countries that have both
incorporated competitive forces and provided these companies some protection from full
liberalization. In this regard, government intervention has created particular pressures,
sources of advantage and business opportunities that have resulted in additional
incentives for these companies' internationalization.
Thesis Supervisor: Donald R. Lessard
Epoch Foundation Professor of International Management, MIT Sloan School of Management
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1. Introduction
During the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, globalization of the world's
economies and technological development created the conditions for the expansion of
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in telecommunications. This tendency was further
boosted by the structural reforms that countries implemented aiming to integrate their
economies to the global flows of production and investment. These reforms included the
liberalization of FDI regimes and the opening of the infrastructure sectors, including
telecommunications, to private investment and competition. As a result, developing
countries started receiving considerable inflows of FDI in telecommunications through
multinational companies, headquartered in developed countries, that either purchased
state-owned telecom providers or entered mobile markets. Telecommunications FDI,
therefore, became an important driver of sector growth in developing countries.
Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, after the downfall of the telecommunications industry and
the emerging economies' crises, many of the existing multinational companies withdrew
their investments from the developing world. This created an investment gap that has
been filled, for the most part, by emerging companies from developing countries. The
internationalization of these domestic companies generated a new wave of investment
commonly called "South-South" FDI that currently represents nearly one-third of foreign
capital inflows in telecommunications in developing economies. However, despite the
expansion of this wave of FDI, only a small number' of developing countries have
become a source of such investments and, consequently, a few2 domestic companies have
emerged as successful players in the international markets.
The relatively high concentration of the sources of South-South FDI in
telecommunications is probably explained by distinctive advantages that have enabled a
few domestic companies to become competitive abroad. The existing literature states that
' During the period 1990-2007, companies from 25 developing countries have originated South-South
investments in telecommunications. Source: PPI Database; own calculations.
2 By 2002, for example, the list of the 30 largest telecommunications multinational corporations included
four companies from developing countries: Datatec and MTN Group from South Africa, Amdrica M6vil
from Mexico and Telekom Malaysia (World Bank, 2006).
these advantages are commonly derived either from firms' indigenous characteristics or
from certain country factors like the size of the domestic markets and the institutional
context in which companies operate. In the case of telecommunications, sector reforms
and the resulting regulatory environments of home and host countries have traditionally
been regarded as primary factors driving these companies' investment decisions in the
international markets.
Telecommunications reforms in the developing world, however, have been commonly
designed amid conflicting policy objectives. On the one hand, for most of the countries
telecom reforms have been an opportunity to bring into domestic markets the benefits of
private participation and competition. On the other hand, by incorporating certain
restrictions into sector liberalization or into privatization, some governments have
attempted to develop strong national companies capable of competing in the global
markets, to keep some control of the provision of services or to obtain additional
revenues. Therefore, different countries have decided to incorporate different levels of
liberalization in their telecommunications sectors. The heterogeneity in sector reforms
may have created additional conditions for the emergence of multinational
telecommunications companies in a number of developing countries since, as a result,
some companies may have encountered favorable conditions in both domestic and
foreign markets. In this regard, the World Bank (2006) has argued that emerging
companies generally come from countries that not only implemented early reforms,
forcing their companies to become more efficient, but that also protected them from full
market liberalization.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the country-level drivers of the wave of South-
South FDI in telecommunications, and find how these factors have shaped emerging
companies' competitive advantages. Specifically, I address two research objectives: First,
to determine what country-level factors have enabled a few domestic companies from
developing countries to emerge as successful players in the international
telecommunications markets. Second, considering the influence that regulatory
environments have traditionally had in the telecommunications sectors, I address the role
that governments have played in the rise of this type of investment.
Using economic and regulatory information of 145 developing countries, collected from
different sources such as the World Bank's and the International Telecommunications
Union's datasets, I build a cross-section econometric model to estimate the country-level
determinants of South-South FDI in telecommunications during the period 1998-2007.
Based on this model, I test the role that countries' regulatory environments have played
in both creating the conditions for the emergence of multinational telecommunications
companies and in shaping their investment decisions in the international markets.
The next section reviews the global FDI tendencies in telecommunications as well as the
conceptual framework within which I build my analysis; it also includes a brief
description of the traditional relationship between regulation and FDI. Chapter 3 presents
the research objectives, methodology and sources of data; it also presents an estimation of
the recent trends in South-South FDI in telecommunications, based on the available
information. In addition, this chapter introduces the econometric model and explains each
one of the included variables. Chapter 4 describes the estimation results. Chapter 5
presents the analysis of these results in the context of this thesis' research objectives.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary and presents the conclusions and policy
implications.
2. Background
This chapter presents the background of my thesis. Initially, I mention the recent global
tendencies in FDI. Then, I describe three waves of telecommunications FDI in
developing countries3 that have taken place since the mid 1980s: Privatizations of
national incumbents, expansion of mobile services, and the rise of South-South FDI. I
also present the conceptual framework regarding the internationalization of companies
from developing countries. Additionally, I present some antecedents about the role of
governments in shaping the paths of FDI flows in developing countries.
2.1 FDI in telecommunications in developing countries
2.1.1 Global tendencies in FDI
One of the main outcomes of globalization has been the expansion of international
production (UNCTAD, 1999). In this context, multinational corporations operating in
foreign countries have made massive investments in order to build and/or control specific
assets required for production; as a result, during the last years FDI around the world has
increased drastically. Between 1990 and 2007, total global FDI net inflows4 grew from
$204 billion to $2.1 trillion, which reflects an average growth rate of 14.8% each year.
The participation of developed countries in international FDI flows has been traditionally
large; over the past decades the share of European Union, Japan and the United States, in
total FDI inflows fluctuated at around 60-70% (UNCTAD, 2006). However, as a result of
economic development, developing countries' participation in these flows has increased
over time; their share of FDI inflows went from an average of 20% at the beginning of
the 1980s to 35% in 2003-2005 (UNCTAD, 2006).
3 In this thesis I follow the World Bank's country classification, which is based on the economies' Gross
National Income (GNI). Accordingly, I use the term "Developing Country" to refer to each of the 145
countries that in 2008 were classified as either low-income or middle-income economies.
4 Source: Word Bank's Word Development Indicators (2009).
Another characteristic of global FDI flows has been the increasing participation of the
services sector; it represented 25% of FDI stock in the early 1970s, 49% in 1990 and 62%
in 20065. Two main factors may explain this structural change (UNCTAD, 2004); first,
the worldwide rise of services consumption during the last years, and second, the
liberalization of services FDI regimes around the world, which eliminated many of the
previously existing barriers to entry for foreign companies.
The composition of global services FDI has also changed over time. Although this sector
has been traditionally dominated by trade and finance industries, these industries'
participation in services FDI stocks dropped from 65% in 1990 to 49% in 20066.
Accordingly, infrastructure -including telecommunications- and businesses services
increased their share in services FDI from 19% to 40% during the same period
(UNCTAD, 2008).
2.1.2 First and second waves ofFDI in telecommunications
The evolution of telecommunications FDI has been consistent with global FDI
tendencies. Until the mid-1980s, this type of investment was negligible since national
companies mostly provided telecommunications services on a monopoly basis. Since the
mid-1980s, this model has been challenged by the increasing globalization of the
economies, by the technological development, and by the generalized changes in sector
regulation. Hence, telecommunications became a multiplayer global industry mainly
dominated by large corporations from developed countries7 that diversified their home
businesses by entering new markets with high growth potential, many of them located in
developing countries. Accordingly, telecommunications FDI flows into the developing
world increased drastically, reaching an average of $23 billion a year between 1996 and
2000'.
5 Sources: UNCTAD (2004), UNCTAD (2008).
6 Source: UNCTAD (2008).
7 From 1990 to 2003, the ten largest foreign investors in telecommunications were all from Europe and the
United States (World Bank, 2006).
Two waves of FDI in telecommunications took place in developing countries during the
late 1980s and 1990s (World Bank, 2006): The first wave started with privatizations of
national incumbents in more than 80 countries9, which created numerous opportunities
for the entry of foreign investors. Incoming foreign companies were expected to bring the
capital, technology and expertise required for the expansion and modernization of the
existing telecommunications networks. In some cases, these companies operated in
consortium with local partners that brought their knowledge of local conditions, including
how to deal with labor and their relations with government (Ramamurti, 2000). Between
1988 and 2006, foreign investors paid $57 billion to the governments for -partial or
total- control over incumbents, and invested $137 billion in the privatized facilities'o
The second wave of telecommunications FDI arose in the mid-1990s with the expansion
of mobile services, originated in the development of digital cellular technologies. The
boom in demand for these new services, as well as the governments' pro-competitive
approach to mobile markets resulted in the massive entry of foreign mobile companies
into more than 100 developing countries building completely new mobile network
infrastructures (World Bank, 2006). Consequently, 38% of the FDI inflows in
telecommunications -and 54% of the projects- during the period 1990-2003
corresponded to mobile telephony".
As a result of these waves of investment, telecommunications FDI became an important
driver for sector growth 12 in developing countries. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s
most of the developed-country telecommunications multinationals that had been main
investors in the developing world started to slow down their investments' 3. This tendency
was part of the generalized reduction in private investment in emerging markets after the
8 Source: World Bank (2006).
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
" Ibid.
12 Contessi (2003) estimated an econometric model on the determinants of telecommunications
performance based on information about 46 transition and emerging economies during the period 1989-
2000. The results show that privatizations are correlated with increases in teledensity and that the share of
foreign ownership in the incumbent has a positive impact in sector indicators.
13 For example AT&T, BellSouth, France Telecom, MCI and SBC retreated from Latin American markets
(World Bank, 2006).
East Asian financial crisis (Harris, 2003). In the case of telecommunications, according to
the World Bank (2006), this phenomenon was also associated with: 1) The bursting of the
telecommunications bubble in developed countries in the late-1990s; 2) the large
operators' compromised balance sheets following major investments and bids for 3G
mobile licenses in Europe, as well as 3) disappointing returns from some projects, which
resulted after these companies' accelerated growth in multiple markets. Moreover,
macroeconomic and regulatory risks in host countries induced these companies to
reconsider additional investments and to withdraw from a number of markets where they
were having returns below expected (World Bank, 2006).
2.1.3 The rise of South-South FDI in telecommunications
Amid the expansion of FDI flows around the world, a number of companies from
developing countries accumulated enough capital and knowledge to invest abroad,
becoming multinationals. These companies commonly came from large developing
countries with growing importance in the world economy (UNCTAD, 2006). This
phenomenon became more frequent over time; for example, the number of Fortune 500
companies headquartered outside United States, Europe, Japan and Oceania, rose from 28
in 1988 to 61 in 200514. As a result, the share of developing countries in global outward
FDI flows increased from a negligible amount in the mid 1980s to 15% in 2005'5
In the case of telecommunications, since the late 1990s, certain companies from
developing economies emerged as significant investors as they started to fill the gap left
by the withdrawal of some international providers from the developed world (Aykut and
Goldstein, 2006). The retreat of large multinationals allowed emerging companies to
acquire assets at low prices, and gave them better chances to obtain new licenses.
The larger role of emerging companies in the telecommunications markets generated two
main effects. First, developing countries saw an important rise of domestic private
14 Source: Aykut and Goldstein (2006).
15 Source: UNCTAD (2006).
funding in this sectorl 6 and second, a number of companies headquartered in these
countries became multinationals, as they started to operate in foreign developing-country
markets.
A number of emerging telecommunications companies, therefore, became important
players within their regions. Telmex Group, for example, turned into the largest mobile
provider in Latin America, South African companies became dominant providers in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Orascom from Egypt invested in markets in the Middle East and North
Africa, Telekom Malaysia entered various countries in South Asia and Africa and both
Russian and Turkish companies expanded into the former Soviet Union countries.
Accordingly, the share of emerging companies in telecommunications FDI in developing
countries (South-South FDI) increased from 20% in the period 1990-1999 to 36% in
2001-2003; in addition, by 2002 four companies 17 from developing countries took part of
the Top-30 list of largest multinational telecommunications companies (World Bank,
2006).
Despite the recent expansion of South-South FDI in telecommunications, however, only
25 of 145 developing countries have become source of such investments. Most of these
countries are relatively large and their telecommunications companies have tended to
invest within their own regions (World Bank, 2006). As I explain below, the exploration
of the country-level drivers of the emergence of multinational telecommunications
companies in a small number of developing countries, as well as the factors affecting
their investment paths, is the primary objective of my thesis.
16 The participation of local investors in telecommunications investment in developing countries rose from
23% in 1998 to 37% in 2003. Source: Ettinger et al. (2005); own calculations.
17 Datatec (South Africa), Am6rica M6vil (Mexico), MTN Group (South Africa) and Telekom Malaysia.
2.2 Conceptual framework
2.2.1 Motivations, competitive advantages and drivers of internationalization
The international business literature has explored extensively the factors driving the
internationalization of firms. Specially, two main topics have been studied: The motives
that domestic firms have to become multinationals and the factors that make possible for
these companies to become competitive in the international markets (Lessard and Lucea,
2008). According to this literature, companies usually have four main motives to explore
foreign markets: Entering new markets (market-seeking motives), exploiting more
efficiently the firm's existing assets (efficiency-seeking motives), gaining control over
scarce resources (resources-seeking motives) and acquiring new strategic assets (strategic
asset-seeking motives).
In addition, firms operating in foreign (host) markets need to have distinctive advantages
that enable them to compete under less favorable conditions and higher transaction costs
than their domestic competitors. International business theories explaining these firms'
advantages were first developed in the 1960s and 1970s when large, product-oriented
corporations dominated international investment (Lessard and Lucea, 2008). Perhaps the
most influential framework developed in this period is the eclectic paradigm proposed by
John Dunning in 1981, also named OLI theory (Ownership, Location,
Internationalization) (Amighini et al., 2009). In his model, Dunning (1981) argues that
firms are able to expand their operations into foreign countries if they possess some of
these advantages: 1) Ownership advantages that refer to the control of specific assets,
such as brand or proprietary technologies, that may be exploited by operating in foreign
markets; 2) location advantages associated with the integration of activities across
countries with different factor costs and resource costs, and 3) internationalization
advantages related to scale and scope economies reached through internalizing activities
across borders (Bonaglia, et al., 2007).
Ownership advantages play a central role in this classical approach, since they are the
primary assets that firms use to respond to internationalization opportunities. These
advantages are generally attributed to a set of both home-country and firm-specific
factors that influence their firms' competitiveness in the international markets. Home-
country factors include endowments, such as labor, skills, capital, demand and supply
conditions and institutions (Porter, 1990). Firm-specific advantages favoring
internationalization consist of proprietary assets such as patents and governance
capabilities (Lessard and Lucea, 2008). Still, companies with limited firm-specific
advantages may also engage in "asset augmenting" strategies, in order to acquire
strategic assets abroad, such as technology, brands, distribution networks, managerial
skills or special facilities (UNCTAD, 2006).
The OLI theory, however, has been criticized because of its limited capacity to explain
the internationalization processes of companies from developing countries. First, this
theory is based on the experience of large, Anglo-American, international firms that
could easily own the resources and capabilities required to invest abroad (Aykut and
Goldstein, 2006); therefore, it does not explain why these companies may become
globally competitive without having any significant advantages at their first stages of
internationalization (Goldstein, 2007). Also, as developing countries may have poor
institutions, this theory predicts that it is unlikely that companies from these countries
become multinationals, unless they operate in specific sectors associated with unskilled
labor or natural resources (Lessard and Lucea, 2008). In addition, critics argue that this
model is static and neglects companies' strategic factors as well as the context
surrounding their investment decisions (Goldstein, 2007).
In 1996, Dunning and Narula responded to these critics by proposing the revised version
of the Investment Development Path (IDP) model, originally developed by Dunning in
1981. This revised model connects, in a dynamic fashion, the economies' FDI patterns
with structural attributes like production structure and institutions. It also incorporates
concepts of path-dependence, idiosyncrasy, and the dynamic interaction between FDI,
growth and governments; in addition, it considers the increasing role of strategic asset
seeking strategies (Dunning et al., 1997).
The IDP theory predicts that the inward and outward FDI position of a country is related
to its level of economic development. Accordingly, this theory sees incoming FDI as an
initial spur for growth (Barnard, 2008) while outbound FDI is originated only when a
country has reached certain development stage, reflecting the evolution of ownership
advantages among firms in that country (UNCTAD, 2006). However, the IDP theory's
prediction of a sequential internationalization process in developing countries has also
been criticized. New studies have pointed out that emerging companies participating in
advanced networks of firms may, through a "leapfrogging" process, reduce the time
needed to enter global markets, catching up with developed-country multinationals
(Amighini et al., 2009; Mathews, 2006).
Researchers, therefore, have attempted to understand the causes of the increasing
emergence of multinational companies from developing countries. There is a general
consensus that this phenomenon reflects the rise in capital stock in these countries, the
increasing openness of the economies, the larger levels of competition, and both the
growing scale and sophistication of emerging companies (Aykut and Goldstein, 2006).
These companies, however, present unique features that indicate they may have
distinctive drivers of internationalization: First, they tend to expand into foreign markets
early in their corporate life, lacking enough resources like technology, financial capital,
brands and experienced management. Second, their paths of international expansion are
incremental, with frequent feedback from experimental learning. Third, most of these
companies achieve internationalization through organizational -as opposed to
technological- innovation adapted to the host markets' conditions (Aykut and Goldstein,
2006). In addition, a number of these emerging companies either operate in sectors
different from natural resources (Lessard and Lucea, 2008) or are headquartered in
countries with deficient business environments (Goldstein, 2007). These trends suggest
that emerging companies tend to internationalize in order to build critical competitive
advantages (Aykut and Goldstein, 2006).
By studying the emerging companies' distinctive features, researchers have found that
these companies commonly derive special competitive advantages from their home
country contexts (Aulakh, 2007). Ramamurti (2009) argues that they are likely to rely on
home country-specific advantages in their early stages of internationalization and that
these advantages become less important in later stages, when the companies' operations
have expanded into many countries and they have acquired more firm-specific
advantages. Some sources of advantage at the country level are the markets' size, the
availability of low-cost labor and the existing social networks with ties with foreign
countries; also, some companies have received benefits from home governments'
industrial policies (Ramamurti, 2009).
Certain companies' characteristics have been also found to be relevant for emerging
companies' internationalization. Idiosyncratic governance structures, for example, might
substitute poor institutions in developing countries (Lessard and Lucea, 2008) since they
may generate alternative sources of capital, gain access to political power and solve
informational and agency-related problems (Khanna and Rivkin, 1999). Other relevant
factors at firm-level are the presence of strong leaders as well as the technological and
organization leapfrogs resulting from the purchase of key knowledge or from companies
acquisitions (Lessard and Lucea, 2008).
Scholars have also studied how emerging companies are able to sustain their competitive
position over time. These studies commonly indicate the importance of mechanisms for
knowledge creation, integration and diffusion within the organizations (Lessard and
Lucea, 2008). Mathews (2006), for example, based on the experience of firms from the
Asia Pacific region, proposed a model denominated LLL in which companies'
internationalization is mainly driven by three factors: First, as latecomers, these
companies build links with incumbents and partners in the host markets (linkage);
second, they use these links to leverage their resources; third, in this process, they learn
about new sources of advantage and how to improve their performance in international
markets (learning).
Lessard and Lucea (2008) propose a model, based on the experience of CEMEX from
Mexico, to illustrate how multinational companies from developing countries achieve
sustained success in foreign markets. Initially, companies develop a set of capabilities,
named capability platform, that result from the interaction between home country and
firm specific advantages. This original set of capabilities not only enables companies to
compete in their home markets but also allow them to expand internationally; the model
defines three necessary conditions, also named as the RATs test, for this to happen. First,
the original set of capabilities must be relevant to customers in foreign markets. Second,
these capabilities need to be transferable across markets, that is, companies must be able
to move these capabilities into host markets regardless of existing entry barriers. Third,
profits resulting from the exploitation of these capabilities in foreign markets need to be
appropriable by the company. In addition, these companies need to adapt and renew their
capability platform in order to maintain or improve their competitive position. Common
sources of capability renewal are either the access to special resources in the host
countries or the insights from the responses of subsidiaries to challenges in foreign
markets. According to these authors, this vision differs from the classic theories of
internationalization that argued that capabilities are originated and adapted at the
companies' headquarters.
In their model, Lessard and Lucea (2008) also consider the mechanisms for the
transference of locally developed new capabilities into the rest of the organization. They
argue that emerging multinationals need to establish processes to assess the relevance,
transferability and appropriability of the new capabilities into the rest of the markets; that
is, they need to evaluate the new capabilities according to the criteria of the RATs test,
which means to apply this test in reverse. Finally, companies need to incorporate
mechanisms to integrate these capacities within the rest of the organization. In this
regard, the continuous process of capability platform exploitation - enhancement -
exploitation enables emerging multinationals to build sustainable businesses.
Knowledge acquisition, therefore, is another crucial element in the internationalization of
emerging companies. In the same line, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) explored how
companies commonly learn and how their new knowledge affects their investment
decisions. A number of firms handle risk problems through an incremental decision-
making process, where information gathered through foreign operations in one phase is
used in the next phase to take further steps; their path of expansion, therefore, is slow and
incremental, with loops of experimental learning (Bonaglia et al., 2007). This strategy
enables firms to build up its knowledge of how to conduct international businesses
(Goldstein, 2007). As a result of this incremental behavior, the distance between home
and host markets, as well as their cultural and institutional differences, becomes a strong
driver of FDI flows, as it increases costs of coordination and uncertainty (Sarkar et al.,
1999).
2.2.2 Internationalization of telecommunications companies
The literature has also identified special drivers of internationalization in the
telecommunications industry. As I mentioned, since the mid-1980s the increasing
globalization of the economies and the generalized changes in sector regulation created
new business opportunities for telecommunications companies. Technological
development further facilitated liberalization by reducing both entry and operation costs
and by introducing new services like mobile telephony and Internet (World Bank, 2006).
As a result, telecommunications became a multiplayer global industry dominated by large
multinational companies.
In this context, host countries' market potential has been a primary driver of FDI. This
potential depends on economic factors such as market size, economic growth and income
per capita. Also, multinational telecommunications companies prefer to operate in foreign
markets where they find some degree of affinity derived from geographical or cultural
proximity, commercial links and political ties (World Bank, 2006).
Sarkar et al. (1999) studied the internationalization processes of telecommunications
carriers during the 1990s. These authors argue that both firm-level factors and
environmental forces have driven these processes. Firm-level factors involve strategic
considerations such as arbitrage opportunities across government policies, strategic
interdependence of global telecommunications markets and systemic ownership
advantages from international presence -better access to financial institutions and
standard-setting agencies-. These factors also include scale considerations like
efficiencies reached through international aggregation of markets. Environmental forces
driving internationalization in this sector include the institutional changes -privatizations
and liberalizations- defined by host governments, and the resulting market opportunities
for multinational companies. Similarly, Kim et al. (2009) point out at factors like
competitive pressures in home markets and the regulatory environment in host countries.
Nevertheless, as I explain in the next section, sometimes these competitive forces have
been constrained by actions of governments or incumbent providers. For example,
Sarkar et al. (1999), Ramamurti (2000) and Kim et al. (2009) argue that early entrants in
global telecommunications markets gained important first-mover advantages such as
monopoly benefits and the potential to influence regulatory processes. Accordingly, these
companies implemented strategies of preemption of both markets and partners, in order
to capture these advantages and improve their competitive position; their strategies
included making preemptive investments, leveraging political connections and deterring
the entry of potential competitors (Ramamurti, 2000).
2.3 FDI and governments in developing countries
Governments usually shape the business environments in which companies operate. They
set the "rules of the game" in the markets and affect the supply and demand of resources;
they also influence the capabilities and motivations of citizens and companies as well as
their participation in international commerce (Dunning, 1992). In this regard,
governments incorporating tough competition regimes may force some companies to be
more efficient and competitive in international markets. For example, Aykut and
Goldstein (2006) argue that the increasing competition in Latin American markets due to
liberalization in the 1990s acted as a selection mechanism where relatively few
companies survived, but those that did were able to compete in the global markets.
Scholars agree that government interventions have also played a key role in
compensating developing-county firms' lack of competitive advantages (Goldstein,
2007). Governmental support in these countries has taken the form of preferred access to
markets, subsidized capital, preferential regulations (Ramamurti, 2009) or public
investments in research and human capital (Goldstein, 2007). Also, some governments
have granted monopoly rights to their domestic companies and these companies have
used the extra profits to invest abroad (Goldstein, 2007). I addition, some governments
have granted fiscal incentives for outward FDI (Aykut and Goldstein, 2006): For
example, China has provided preferential loans and tax rebates for their outward-
investing companies; Malaysia and Thailand actively promote their firms' investments in
nearby countries, and Brazil has provided special credit lines to support outward FDI.
State support, however, may incorporate competitive distortions in the markets as well.
This possibility may create a policy conflict for governments since they generally also
have responsibilities of promoting market competition and of preventing the emergence
of monopolies (Goldstein, 2007). The likely tradeoff between market competition and
industry competitiveness, therefore, has become a major determinant of policy-making in
developing countries.
State support sometimes has been regarded as an unfair advantage in international
competition (Ramamurti, 2009). The World Trade Organization (WTO), therefore, has
promoted the development of FDI regimes that encourage competition and avoid
government-created advantages for domestic companies. Consequently, most developing
countries have continued to liberalize their investment regimes during the last years and
only a number of them have taken actions to either protect their industries from foreign
competition or to increase the control of the state in some companies" (UNCTAD,
2006).
18 UNCTAD identified 205 policy changes in FDI regimes implemented in 2005 around the world. Most of
them (sector liberalization, privatizations, promotional efforts, operational measures and FDI admissions)
made conditions more favorable for foreign companies. Some others (nationalizations, taxation, new
requirements) made host countries less favorable to FDI.
In addition, developing-country governments have also shaped their domestic companies'
business opportunities by signing preferential agreements that have encouraged intra-
regional trade and investments; these arrangements include the South African
Development Community, the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), MERCOSUR, the
Andean Community, and a number of bilateral investment agreements and double
taxation treaties (Aykut and Goldstein, 2006). In this regard, developing countries have
seen South-South cooperation as an additional mechanism to overcome development
challenges; one of the reasons is that the emergence of multinational companies from
developing countries may generate additional benefits for home and host countries in
terms of regional integration, new sources of investment capital -mainly for low-income
countries- and domestic firms' competitiveness (Aykut and Goldstein, 2006).
2.3.1 Telecommunications FDI and governments in developing countries
Telecommunications has traditionally been regarded as an important sector in the
economies because of its role in communications and information dissemination; these
activities, in turn, are important factors of countries' competitiveness and socioeconomic
development (Wang, 2003). Many developing countries, however, have traditionally had
difficulties to finance projects in these sectors, given governments' fiscal constrain and/or
private sectors' lack of expertise and capital sources. In these countries, therefore,
telecom FDI has been seen as the solution to reduce existing gaps in technology and
financial resources.
As I mentioned, in a context of increasing globalization and technological development,
since the 1980s most developing countries have implemented structural reforms aiming
to bring the benefits of competition as well as new financing sources, including FDI. The
reforms have included privatization of state-owned providers, introduction of competition
in the markets and creation of regulatory institutions. Countries have implemented these
reforms in different ways. In some cases privatization has been partial and the
government has retained partial ownership of the incumbent (Wallsten, 2001). Also, in a
number of countries introduction of competition has been gradual or its emphasis has
been in different services: Either in fixed-line or in mobile telephony. In addition, various
countries have liberalized their foreign investment regimes in telecommunications. For
example, in 1998, 72 countries, including 39 developing countries, signed the Agreement
of Basic Telecommunications Services of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this
arrangement, all signatories agreed to open their telecommunications markets to
operators based in other WTO countries, on a most-favored-nation basis (Wang, 2003).
Governments in developing countries, however, have faced conflicting objectives
concerning the role of telecommunications FDI. Regarding incoming FDI, Wang (2003)
points out that policies on sector liberalization are often regarded as indicators of the
governments' position on trade opportunities and economic growth vis-a-vis sovereignty.
The reason is that, although FDI has traditionally been recognized as a driver of sector
growth, in some cases it has also been seen as a factor undermining countries'
independence and control over communications channels and content (Wang, 2003).
Consequently a number of developed and developing countries have defined restrictions
to foreign investment in the telecommunications sector. For example, during the WTO
negotiations on telecommunications services, 24 countries, including 8 high-income 19
and 12 developing countries20, signed a clause that allows them to keep restrictions on
foreign ownership in these sectorS21. Likewise, in the fist half of the 1990s, motivated by
expected revenues from privatization transactions, many governments granted the
privatized companies exclusivity periods (5-10 years) in basic services that, according to
the World Bank (2006), conflicted with the mentioned WTO commitments. Multilateral
development institutions have criticized such constraints to incoming FDI. According to
the World Bank (2006), in most cases, foreign ownership restrictions limit takeover risk
and management accountability and reduce investment incentives, inhibiting effective,
profit-oriented management. In addition, this Bank argues, with the generalized opening
19 Canada, France, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, USA, Singapore and Israel. Source: Wang (2003).20 Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Malaysia, Colombia, Indonesia, Morocco, Philippines, Tunisia, Ghana,
India and China. Source: Wang (2003).
21 According to UNCTAD (2008), by 2007 foreign ownership restrictions in telecommunications in some
developing countries were: China 49%, India 74%, Indonesia 35%, Malaysia 30%, Mexico 49% (fixed
operators), Philippines 40%, and Thailand 49%.
up of the markets, foreign investors increasingly reject these limitations, since they have
less possibilities of operating as monopolies.
Additionally, developing countries have made policy decisions with diverse effects on
outward FDI in telecommunications; these policies have ranged between, on the one
hand, incorporating high levels of competition in the markets, or, on the other,
incorporating certain limits to competitive forces in order to promoting the development
of strong national companies, capable of operating in foreign countries. In this regard, the
World Bank (2006) states that most of the emerging multinational companies in
telecommunications come from developing countries that not only implemented early
reforms, forcing these companies to become more efficient, but that also protected them
from full market liberalization.
Mariscal and Rivera (2005), for example, studied the dissimilar telecommunications
reforms implemented in Latin America, which incorporated different levels of market
liberalization. According to these authors, the divergence in policy implementation comes
from the countries' heterogeneous interaction between policy constraints, groups of
interests and ideologies; in general, policy-makers designed reforms that minimized
political friction, allowing interest groups to increase their potential influence. Therefore,
different policies arose in this region: In Mexico, for example, policy-makers attempted
to create "National Champions" from their privatized companies; Brazil, on the contrary,
developed a more competitive market structure and renounced to keep a vertically-
integrated telecommunications incumbent. As policy outcomes, in a decade Mexico
developed a strong telecommunications industry that reached regional dominance while
some large Brazilian operators faced bankruptcy; however, Brazil reached higher welfare
gains in terms of lower tariffs and higher penetration of telecommunications services
(Mariscal and Rivera, 2005).
The mentioned heterogeneity of the telecommunications reforms, as well as the
governments' diverse approaches to incoming and outward FDI, probably have been
important factors driving the flows of South-South FDI in this sector. In this context,
domestic telecommunications companies facing favorable regulations in both home and
host countries probably have developed additional advantages that have enabled them to
become multinationals. As I explain in the next chapter, one of the objectives of my
thesis is to infer to what extent government regulation in home and host countries has had
an active role in these companies' internationalization.
3. Research objectives and methodology
This chapter describes the thesis problem and research objectives; it also explains both
the data and methodology used. In addition, based on the collected data, it presents the
main trends of South-South FDI in telecommunications during the period 1990-2007.
Finally, the chapter introduces the econometric model and describes its variables.
3.1 The problem
As mentioned in Chapter 2, since the 1980s telecommunications companies around the
world have faced external forces like technological development and increasing
competition that have encouraged them to expand their networks, to become more
efficient, and to look for new markets abroad. In this context, during the last years South-
South FDI in this sector has increased substantially, gaining increasing attention. This
type of FDI not only currently represents nearly one third of foreign capital inflows in
telecommunications into developing countries, but it also reflects the emergence of a
number of telecommunications companies from such countries venturing abroad and
becoming multinationals. South-South FDI, therefore, may have important implications
for the expansion of telecommunications infrastructure as well as for the competitiveness
of the domestic telecoms industries in developing countries.
However, despite the recent expansion of this wave of FDI, only a small number22 (25) of
developing countries have become source of such investments and, consequently, a few
22 Source: PPI Database; own calculations.
domestic companies have emerged as successful players in the international
telecommunications markets. These companies tend to be headquartered in relatively
large countries and they tend to invest primarily within their own regions.
The relatively high concentration in sources of South-South FDI in telecommunications
is probably explained by distinctive advantages that have enabled a few domestic
companies to become competitive in the international markets. As explained in Chapter
2, scholars have argued these advantages are commonly derived either from firms'
indigenous characteristics or from certain country factors like the size of the domestic
markets and the institutional context in which they operate. In the case of
telecommunications, the regulatory environment of home and host countries has
traditionally been regarded as one of the primary factors driving these companies'
investment decisions in the international markets.
Governments in developing countries, however, have faced conflicting objectives when
implementing reforms in their telecommunications sectors. On the one hand, for most of
the countries telecom reforms have been an opportunity to bring into domestic markets
the benefits of competition and private participation. On the other hand, by incorporating
certain restrictions into sector liberalization or into privatization, some governments have
attempted to develop strong national companies capable of competing in the global
markets, to keep some control in the provision of services or to obtain additional
revenues. In the case of sector liberalization, the dissimilar reforms implemented by
developing countries, therefore, have probably incorporated additional conditions for the
emergence of multinational telecommunications companies in some of these countries.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the country-level drivers of the recent wave of
South-South FDI in telecommunications and find how these drivers have shaped
emerging companies' competitive advantages. Specifically, I address two research
objectives: First, to determine what country-level factors have enabled a few domestic
companies from developing countries to emerge as successful players in the international
telecommunications markets. Second, to identify the role governments have played in the
rise of this type of investment. Second, considering the influence that regulatory
environments have traditionally had in the telecommunications sectors, I address the role
that governments have played in the rise of this type of investment.
3.2 Methodology and data
I performed an econometric estimation of the economic and policy determinants of the
South-South wave of FDI in telecommunications. The estimated model regresses two
dependent variables associated with the FDI flows between home and host countries on a
set of variables representing such countries' economic, regulatory and geographical
characteristics.
The data I used in the estimation comes from different sources. First, I collected yearly
economic information about 145 developing countries during the period 1990-2007 from
the Word Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset. General economic data
include these countries' yearly GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, population, exports,
and imports. Second, I utilized data about the countries' participation in preferential trade
agreements from the World Bank's World Trade Indicators Report (WTR), as well as
information about each country's business environment from the World Bank's Doing
Business 2009 report (DB). Third, I gathered yearly information about developing
countries' telecommunications sectors from the International Telecommunications
Union's World Telecommunications Indicators (WTI) database. This data contains
telephone services penetration, levels of competition in the markets, barriers to entry,
degree of privatization of state-owned providers, and existence of separate
telecommunications regulators. Fourth, I collected additional information about the
characteristics 23 of the reforms in telecommunications, from the Paul Budde
Communications' Research Reports (PBC).
23 Years in which reforms were implemented, whether the government granted mobile licenses to main
fixed line operators, and initial mobile standards.
The information about the countries' FDI flows in telecommunications comes from the
World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (PPI). This database
includes information 24 on 806 telecom private projects executed in 134 developing
countries since 1990, which corresponds to the 85% of the total telecoms FDI amount in
these countries (World Bank, 2006). From this database, I used each project's specific
information on total investment and foreign contribution, including the investing
companies and source countries. A limited number of projects in this database contains
incomplete information on foreign sources; in these cases, I estimated the FDI component
based on the existing information for the project, as well as on information about
company or project available in electronic sources such as Business Monitor, ISI
emerging markets, and the companies' WebPages.
It is relevant to mention that World Bank's methodology to record the PPI database
includes a review mechanism by which project information is updated each year; because
of this method, although the investment flows are presented on a yearly basis, the
information about sources does not include previous investors who have sold their
participations in the past2 5. Considering this limitation, I built my analysis on the total,
instead of the yearly, FDI flows between home and host countries during the analyzed
period 26; total flows can also be interpreted as a proxy measure of the accumulated stock
of capital in each project at the end of the period (2007). Considering this characteristic
of the existing data, as I describe below, I used a cross-section methodology in my
research.
Based on the collected information, therefore, I assembled a cross-section dataset
including 402 observations where each point corresponds to a relation between a source
country i (home) and a recipient countryj (host). Each observation represents the total
flow of telecoms FDI from i toj during the analyzed period and it is associated in the
24 The main variables included in this database are: Type of project, location, contract period, percentage
private, government payment commitments, investment in physical assets, total investment, capacity,
technology, sponsors including participation (%), and multilateral support.
25 Accordingly, the PPI database does not include sources information regarding emerging multinationals
that have retreated from developing countries.
dataset with a number of economic and regulatory variables from both countries i and j
during the same period. Of the total 402 observations, 134 correspond to pairs of
developing countries that had actual FDI flows during the mentioned period, according to
the PPI database. The remaining 268 observations are randomly selected pairs of
countries with no FDI flows during the mentioned period.
3.3 Main trends in telecommunications South-South FDI
Before presenting the econometric model, this section describes in more detail the main
trends of the wave of South-South FDI in telecommunications between 1990 and 2007,
estimated from the above-mentioned cross-section dataset. During the mentioned period,
25 developing countries generated FDI in this sector and 87 developing countries
received investments from other developing countries. South-South investors participated
in 164 telecommunications projects that correspond to 29% of the projects in developing
countries (561) receiving any type of FDI during the mentioned period.
Table 1 presents the estimated distribution of the total investments in developing
countries' telecommunications sectors during the period 1990-2007, discriminated by
receiving region. Total investments are classified into national investments (public and
private) and FDI, which in turn includes South-South FDI and North-South FDI.
Receiving regions are defined according to the Word Bank's geographical classification
of developing countries. This classification divides these countries in six regions: East
Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA).
As shown in Table 1, during the period 1990-2007 developing countries received $617
billion in total investment in telecommunications; of this amount, $269 billion (43%)
26 In this manner, in case a given project had previous investors not recorded in the database, their
investments should be reflected in the purchase-value registered for current investors.
correspond to telecoms FDI, which represent 11% of the total FDI flows, 27 received by
these countries in all sectors during the period. South-South FDI flows in
telecommunications reached $63 billion, which represents 10% of the total investments in
this sector in developing countries; this relatively low participation is consistent with the
fact that South-South FDI was embryonic until the end of the 90s28 .
In terms of regions, two of them received about 70% of the overall FDI flows in
telecommunications: Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Central Asia.
This finding is consistent with the World Bank's (2006) calculations of
telecommunications FDI during the period 1990-2003. This Bank (2006) points out that
some privatization transactions in Latin America included requirements of foreign
participation while countries in Europe and Central Asia, when transitioning from
planned economies, opened their telecommunications markets to foreign providers; on
the other hand, domestic investors, including family groups, have had an important role
in other regions such as South Asia, and East Asia and Pacific. Geographical differences
can also be seen in terms of the participation of FDI in the total telecommunications
investment in each region; whereas in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Europe
and Central Asia, FDI represented 49% of total investment in telecommunications during
1990-2007, this fraction was only 20% and 26% in the cases of East Asia and Pacific and
South Asia, respectively.
27 Developing countries received $2,540 billion of FDI during the period 1990-2007. Source: World Bank's
WDI Database. Own calculations.
28 South-South FDI represented only 8% of the investment flows in telecommunications in developing
countries during the period 1990-1999. Source: Word Bank PPI Database, Author's own calculations.
Table 1: Investment flows in telecommunications in
South
FDI
(Mill.)
North
FDI
(Mill.)
National
Investment
(Mill.)
Total
Investment
(Mill.)
FDI as %% Total
oftotalFDI investment
East Asia &East  3,824 12,254 63,713 79,792 6% 20%Pacific
Europe &Europe & 7,108 66,252 77,268 150,628 27% 49%Central Asia
Latin America & 31,251 82,303 119,974 233,528 42% 49%Caribbean
Middle East &Mi   4,452 17,047 16,970 38,469 8% 56%North Africa
South Asia 8,062 14,999 41,870 64,930 9% 36%
Sub-Saharan Africa 7,952 13,476 28,124 49,551 8% 43%
Total 62,649 206,332 347,917 616,898 100% 43%
% 10% 33% 56% 100%
Source: World Bank's PPI Database. Author's analysis and calculations.
As I mentioned, from the data, South-South FDI in telecommunications during the period
1990-2007 was generated by 25 developing countries located across the six world
regions. Table 2 presents a regional breakdown of the total flows ($63 billion) of this
wave of investment, discriminated by source and host regions. As shown, most of these
investments (84%) were intraregional, which suggests that both physical and cultural
distance between home and host countries may be relevant factors explaining South-
South FDI.
Table 2 also shows that Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the biggest
amount of intraregional South-South FDI, $31 billion; this value represents almost half of
the overall FDI flows originated in developing countries during this period and
corresponds mainly to the regional expansion of the Telmex Group (Mexico) into 13
Latin American countries. Intraregional FDI in East Asia and Pacific ($3,8 billion)
corresponds to the internationalization of telecommunications companies from China
(including Hong Kong), Malaysia, Thailand, and Korea. Intraregional flows in Europe
and Central Asia ($7 billion) represent the expansion of companies from Russian
Federation, Turkey, Serbia, Hungary and Kazakhstan. In Middle East and North Africa,
intraregional FDI flows are associated with companies from Egypt, whereas in South
developing countries, 1990-2007
Asia only companies from India generated FDI flows into nearby countries. In addition,
intraregional FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa is mainly explained by the internationalization
of companies from South Africa (e.g. MTN and Vodacom).
Table 2 shows as well that East Asia and Pacific, and Middle East and North Africa are
the two regions with the highest values of outward FDI into other regions; these values
are associated with the international expansion of companies from China (Hong Kong)
and Malaysia into countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, by Egyptian
companies going into South Asia and by companies from Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia
expanding their operations into countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 2: Telecommunications South-South FDI by regions, 1990-2007
To \ From ($ Millions) EAP ECA LAC MENA SA SSA Total
East Asia & Pacific 3,824 - - - - 3,824
Europe & C. Asia 56 6,956 - 96.7 - - 7,108
Latin Am. & Caribbean - 225.9 31,025 - - - 31,251
M. E. & N. Africa 80 1.8 - 3,652 - 718 4,452
South Asia 4,361 33.1 - 3,476 68 125 8,062
Sub-Saharan Africa 332 - - 484 106 7,030 7,952
Total 8,652 7,216 31,025 7,708 174 7,874 62,649
Source: World Bank's PPI Database. Author's analysis and calculations.
The wave of South-South FDI in telecommunications can be subdivided by type of
project and market segment. The World Bank classifies telecommunications projects into
three types (World Bank, 2006): 1) Divestures, which refers to privatization of state-
owned telecommunications companies; 2) Greenfield projects, that is, operations
involving new licenses and investments in new companies, and 3) Concessions, which
involves fixed-term management and operation contracts with major capital expenditures.
Figure 1 shows that most (77%) of the South-South investments between 1990 and 2007
were made in Greenfield projects. This reflects that emerging investors have mainly
purchased either licenses for new operations or participations in former entrants, rather
than shares in state-owned incumbents. In addition, as Figure 1 also illustrates, a large
fraction of these investments (63%) are associated with exclusive operations in the
mobile market, which suggests that South-South investors have taken advantage of the
momentum generated by the recent mobile growth in developing countries.
40,000.0
4 Fixed Access, Long Distance
35,000.0 - Mobile Access
3 FA, LD, and MA
30,000.0
25,000.0
20,000.0
5,000.0
0.0
Greenfield project Divestiture Concession
Figure 1: Telecommunications South-South FDI by type of project, 1990-2007
Source: World Bank's PPI Database. Author's analysis and calculations
South-South FDI in telecommunications can also be analyzed according to the profile of
investors and their size of investments. From the dataset, I categorized the investors into
three broad groups: 1) Fixed and/or mobile telecommunications companies, 2) Holding
companies with branches providing telecommunications services, and 3) Financial
investors such as banks and investment funds. As shown in Table 3 telecommunications
and holding companies originated 99% of South-South FDI flows. These companies have
usually invested in new operators or have purchased major participations in existing
providers; accordingly, a large fraction (92%) of this South-South FDI wave was
associated with majority participations in telecommunications providers. Conversely,
although financial investors have increased their participation in telecommunications in
developing countries since the late 90s, these investors have usually looked for short-term
investments, preferring the role of minority shareholders in sound companies (World
Bank, 2006).
..... ......... ..........
Table 3 also presents the amount of FDI flows by each group of emerging investors,
considering three possible sizes of investments: 1) Large investments (more than $1
billion during the period), 2) medium investments (between $100 million and $1 billion),
and 3) small investments (less than $100 million). The Table shows that telecom South-
South FDI between 1990 and 2007 was generated by a large group (68) of emerging
investors. Among these investors, 40 telecommunications companies are responsible for
89% of the FDI flows, whereas 22 holdings and 6 financial investors originated 10% and
1%, respectively. Considering the size of investments, 10 investors (7 telecommunication
companies and 3 holdings) with investments above $1 billion each, concentrated 88% of
the wave of South-South FDI in this sector.
Table 3: Telecommunications South-South FDI by investor profile, 1990-2007
Investment Telecom HoldingFinancial Total
Size Company Investors
($ Millions) Inv. Investors Iv. Investors Iv. Investors Iv. Investors
>=$1,000 50,053 7 4,844 3 - - 54,897 10
>=100, <1,000 4,915 11 1,207 4 170 1 6,292 16
<100 744 22 563 15 154 5 1,461 42
Total 55,712 40 6,614 22 324 6 62,649 68
Source: World Bank's PPI Database. Author's analysis and calculations.
Table 4 summarizes the investments paths of the 10 largest investors of this wave of FDI.
As shown, these companies' home countries29 are located in different world regions and
tend to be among the biggest and more developed countries in their continents.
Consequently, these companies have located their foreign investments primarily within
their continent, and once they have reached regional dominance, some of them have
decided to expand gradually into other world regions. Examples of this trend of regional
expansion are Group Telmex from Mexico that currently operates in 13 countries in Latin
America; Orascom from Egypt has presence in 4 countries in the MENA region and has
gradually expanded into other 4 countries in Asia; MTN Group from South Africa has
29 Group Telmex is headquartered in Mexico (Latin America and the Caribbean), Orascom in Egypt
(Middle East and North Africa), MTN Group in South Africa (Sub Saharan Africa); Telekom Malaysia and
invested in 15 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 4 additional countries in the MENA
region and South Asia. Also, Telekom Malaysia operates in 6 Asian countries and has
expanded into 3 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, although this company has been
gradually pulling out of this region (Word Bank, 2006).
Governments are the majority shareholders of four of these 10 investors: Telekom
Malaysia and the three companies from Russian Federation 30 . These companies from
Russian Federation seem to have a distinctive path of investment; although almost all of
their investments have been within the Europe and Central Asia region, these
intraregional flows have gone only to the countries of the former Soviet Union. This path
suggest that these investments may have also been affected by existing cultural and
ethnic ties between Russian Federation and these host countries, as well as by other
considerations such as strategic criteria defined by the government.
Table 4: Telecommunications South-South FDI 1990-2007, large investors
Home Estimated # Host
Region Home Country Company Investment Host Regions
($ Millions) Countries
America M6vilLAC Mexico Amic M il 30,939 13 LACTelmex
MENA Egypt, Arab Rep. Orascom 6,917 8 MENA, SSA, SA
SSA South Africa MTN Group 6,246 19 SSA, MENA, SA
EAP, SA, MENA,EAP Malaysia Telekom Malaysia 3,428 9 ESASSA
EAP Hong Kong, China Hut. Whampoa 1,866 5 EAP, SA, SSA
ECA Russian Federation AFK Sistema MTS 1,628 2 ECA
ECA Russian Federation Vimpelcom 1,372 6 ECA
ECA Russian Federation Alfa Group 1,349 4 ECA, LAC
ECA Turkey Turkcell 1,151 5 ECA
54,897
Source: World Bank's PPI Database. Author's analysis and calculations.
Hutchison Whampoa are from Malaysia, Hong Kong-China, respectively (East Asia and Pacific). The
remaining four companies are from Russian Federation and Turkey (Europe and Central Asia).30 Sources: Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., "Russia - Key Statistics and Telecommunications
Market", 2008. Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., "Malaysia - Key Statistics, Telecommunications
Overview and Major Players", 2008.
In addition, as I mentioned, 58 medium and small investors from developing countries
also generated FDI in telecommunications during 1990-2007. Table 5 summarizes the
investment paths for these investors, which include 40 emerging telecommunications
companies. As seen, these investors are headquartered in 24 countries; they tended to
invest in a smaller number of countries and their investments were primarily intraregional
or located in nearby regions.
Two main investment trends for these medium and small investors can also be inferred
from Table 5. First, these investors when coming from large countries such as China,
Malaysia, Russia and Turkey, tended to internationalize into the same regions -and in
some case countries- where these countries' biggest investors were also operating. This
trend supports the premise that there may be specific economic, administrative or
geographical factors in home and host countries, influencing companies' foreign
investment decisions. Second, in contrast to the case of major investors, a number of
small investors are headquartered in countries that are neither the biggest nor the most
developed in their regions. For example, various emerging companies from countries in
Sub Saharan Africa and East and Central Asia expanded their operations into a few
nearby countries with similar size and economic conditions. This fact suggests that these
small companies may have specific internationalization strategies associated with
reaching minimum scale of operations by entering nearby countries.
South-South FDI 1990-2007, small investors
Source: World Bank's PPI Database. Author's analysis and calculations.
3.4 Econometric model
I employed two alternative cross-section econometric models to estimate the country-
level determinants of the South-South wave of FDI in telecommunications. For the
analysis, I chose the 10-year period 1998-2007, when a significant portion (90%)31 of this
wave of investment took place. In the models, I suppose a causal relationship between
FDI flows and a number of control variables associated with the countries' economic,
institutional and geographic characteristics. I also included a number of variables
reflecting the characteristics of governmental intervention in the telecommunications
3~ Source: Word Bank PPI Database, Author's own calculations.
Home
Region
EAP
EAP
EAP
EAP
ECA
ECA
ECA
ECA
ECA
LAC
MENA
MENA
MENA
MENA
MENA
MENA
SA
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
Home
Country
China
Malaysia
Korea, Rep.
Thailand
Hungary
Serbia
Russian Fed.
Turkey
Kazakhstan
Ecuador
Libya
Egypt, A. R.
Lebanon
Morocco
Jordan
Tunisia
India
South Africa
Sudan
Botswana
Senegal
Nigeria
C6te d'Ivoire
Mauritius
Companies
10
4
4
3
1
1
2
3
2
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
5
6
1
1
1
1
1
2
58
Estimated
Investment
($ Millions)
1,409
1,361
458
131
641
597
216
163
98
86
301
233
122
81
33
23
174
894
237
202
145
69
44
37
7,752
Average
Investment
($ Millions)
140.9
340.2
114.4
43.6
641.3
596.9
108.1
54.3
48.9
86.4
150.5
232.5
40.5
81.0
32.7
22.5
34.7
149.1
236.5
202.3
145.2
69.0
43.8
18.4
# Host
countries
2
4
3
3
2
2
3
2
2
1
3
1
4
2
1
1
5
9
2
4
2
1
5
3
Host Regions
EAP, SA, SSA
EAP, SA, SSA
EAP, ECA
EAP, SA
ECA
ECA
ECA
ECA, MENA
ECA, SA
LAC
SSA
MENA
ECA, SSA
SSA
MENA
SSA
SA, SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
Table 5: Telecommunications
sectors in home and host countries. The equation's functional form follows the basic
gravity framework commonly used in the FDI literature 32. This framework assumes that
the flows of commerce or investment between two countries should increase with size of
the economies while decreasing with the physical distance between them.
I first tested a Logit model of the probability of existence of a positive FDI flow from
home country i to host countryj during the mentioned period. As presented in Table 6, in
this model I used a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if country i generated a
positive FDI flow to countryj, and a value of 0 otherwise. Alternatively, I estimated a
Tobit model where the dependent variable corresponds to the total amount of FDI flows
between source and host countries during the mentioned period; this variable is
continuous, positive, and truncated at 0 -there are no negative values for the FDI flows
form i to j-.
Equation (1) represents the basic specification of the two mentioned cross-section
models. fdiy represents the two alternative dependent variables (dummy and continuous)
associated with the FDI flows from home countries to host countries during the period.
CVi is a vector of control variables related to structural characteristics of the home and
host economies. The equation also includes 8 variables associated with the regulatory
environment in home and host countries. I estimated equation (1) two times, using as
dependent variable each one of the two measures of FDI. Variables definition, data
sources and expected signs are presented in Table 6.
fdiij = a + 0 (CVi) + 3 (compdum) + 132 (compdumj) + /33 (privdumi) + /34 (privdum)
+ fs (earlyprivi) + 36 (exclusivi) + 17 (maxforeigni) + 3s (maxforeign) + Eij (1)
32 Head and Ries (2008) developed a theoretical model of FDI based on the international market for
corporate control (mergers and acquisitions). According to their model, FDI flows should depend on three
main determinants: geographic and cultural distance between bilateral partners, origin-country (outward)
effects and destination-country (inward) effects.
Table 6: Determinants of telecommunications South-South FDI
Variable Exp. SourceVariable Variable Justification Description SourceGroup Sign
Logit Model: 1 if positive
telecommunications FDI flow from
source country i to host countryj
during period 1998-2007, 0
otherwise.fdij Dependent otherwis PPITobit Model: FDI value, if positive
telecommunications FDI flow from
country i to countryj during period
1998-2007, 0 otherwise. Values
listed in US million
Country i (countryj) population in
popi (pop) Control Market size 1998, measured in million + (+) WDI
inhabitants
Gross Domestic Product per capita
Dev. stage, of country i (countryj) at the WDI
market size beginning of the 10-year period
(1998). Values listed in US dollars
Relative Dummy: 1 if country i presented a
rgdpgrow Control market larger average GDP growth rate + WDI
rgdpgrow Control market during the period 1998-2007 than
countryj, 0 otherwise
Economy's Average yearly exports as a
opennessi Control propensity to percentage of GDP during 1998- + WDI
(openness) globalization 2007
Commercial Dummy: 1 if home and host
affinity countries had reciprocal preferential
tradedumo.  Control between trade agreements notified to the + WTR
home and GATT/WTO during the period, 0
host countries otherwise.
Costs
structure in Average yearly urban population as
urbanpop Control telecom a percentage of total population. + WDI
Period 1998-2007business
Relative position of host country in
the World Bank's Doing BusinessBusiness
usiness Control conditions, ranki g during 2007. Limit values: + DB
bsiness Control conditions, 0 if country occupied the last
risk
position (#181), and I if it reached
the first position.
Dummy: 1 if country i presented a
larger total (fixed and mobile)
rtotpen Control market penetration of telecommunications
rpenmart services than countryj, at the
beginning of the period (1998); 0
otherwise
Variable Exp.Variable Variable Justification Description Exp. SourceGroup Sign
Physical Physical distance between the Time
distance
.  
Control distance. capitals of countries i andj. Values and
Affinity in miles Date33
Main; Home (Host) Dummy: 1 if the home (host)
compdumi telecom Market government granted three or more + WTI
(compdum) telecom Market mobile licenses during the ten-year (ND) (PBC)
policy Competition period; 0 otherwise
privdumi Main; Privatization Dummy: 1 if the home (host) WTI
privdumi telecom state-owned government privatized its national + (+)
policy incumbents incumbent before 2007; 0 otherwise
Main; Early Dummy: 1 if country i privatized its WTI
earlypriv telecom .ittelecom sector before privatization (PBC
policy in countryj; 0 otherwise
Main; Ent. Barriers Dummy: 1 if the home government WTI
exclusivi telecom at home granted a exclusivity period to the +
policy country main fixed provider; 0 otherwise
Main; Ent. Barriers Maximum percentage of foreign WTI
maxforeigni telecom at home ownership allowed in home country (PBC)
policy country during the period
Main; Ent. Barriers Maximum percentage of foreign WTI
maxforeignj telecom at host ownership allowed in host country + (PBC)
policy country during the period
3.4.1 The variables
* Control variables, markets' size and growth
I initially included a number of control variables in the model in order to isolate the effect
of countries' economic and institutional characteristics on the South-South FDI flows in
telecommunications. First, following the gravity framework for international commerce, I
included home and host countries' markets size, measured as countries' population (pop).
I expect host countries' population to have a positive influence in such FDI flows for two
reasons. First, big markets represent large business opportunities for investing companies.
Second, scale economies enable telecommunications firms to reduce costs and to improve
their bargaining positions. In this regard, Reynolds et al (2004) found that this variable is
a significant determinant of incoming FDI in host developing countries. In the case of
home countries, however, the size of the markets may have two contrasting effects: In
small countries, the market size might encourage local companies to look for new
33 Source: www.timeanddate.com
businesses abroad while in large countries the size of the market might give local
companies the economies of scale they need to be competitive in international markets.
As I mention later, from the FDI statistics I found that the home countries have been, on
average, larger than the host countries; given this, I expect a positive effect of home
country population on FDI flows.
I also included the countries' real gross domestic product per capita (gdpc) as a control
variable for the size of the markets. This variable is frequently used in FDI studies as a
measure of income level and demand in the economy (Kirkpatrick et al, 2006) and it is
fundamental in the IDP model which argues economic development is a positive
determinant of outward and incoming FDI. This variable has been found significant for
outward FDI in developing countries by Andreff (2003) and Pantelidis (2005) as well as
for incoming FDI by Root and Ahmed (1979), Jun and Singh (1996), Reynolds et al.
(2004) and Kirkpatrick et al (2006), among others. Considering this, I expect that both
home and host countries' GDP per capita have a positive effect in FDI flows in
telecommunications.
GDP growth has also been commonly used in FDI studies. Root and Ahmed (1979), Jun
and Singh (1996) and Reynolds et al. (2004) obtained that it is a positive determinant for
incoming FDI into developing countries. However, other authors -Agodo (1998) and
Andreff (2003)- have not found this variable is significant in explaining FDI flows. In
the case of telecommunications, the World Bank (2006) points out that increasing wealth
in some emerging market economies have increased their supply of capital, enabling their
companies to invest abroad. Considering this, I decided to test the effect of home
country's GDP growth relative to the growth of host country, by including a dummy
variable (rgdpgrow) that takes a value of 1 if home country grew at a higher average rate
than host country during the period, and 0 otherwise. I expect faster-growing home
countries to become, ceteris paribus, in source of telecommunications FDI for host
countries.
* Control variables, additional characteristics of home and host countries
I incorporated a second group of control variables related to additional characteristics of
home and host countries that may affect FDI flows between them. First, economies'
openness and integration are economic variables commonly used in FDI literature. In
different studies, Jun and Singh (1996), Reynolds et al. (2004) and Kirkpatrick et al.
(2006) found that either exports or imports are significant determinants of FDI inflows in
developing countries. Equally, Buckley et al. (2007) and Banga (2007) estimated that
exports and imports contribute to explain outward FDI in this type of countries. In
addition, Root and Ahmed (1979) and Banga (2007) found that countries' participation in
trade and investment agreements is an important factor explaining FDI flows in the
developing world.
I included, therefore, countries' economic openness (openness), measured by the average
yearly exports as a percentage of GDP during the period. A country's exports intensity
reflects the outward orientation of national industry, as well as the existence of exporters
that may demand telecommunications services abroad. Hence I expect that home
country's exports have a positive effect on FDI flows. In the case of host countries, trade
openness reflects the economy's orientation to globalization although it also may suggest
higher levels of competition in these countries' markets. Nevertheless, given that -as I
mention below- I am also controlling the model for competition in the telecom markets, I
also expect this variable to have a positive sign.
In addition, I added a dummy variable (tradedum) to control for the participation in
common preferential trade agreements, reflecting home and host countries' economic
integration. I anticipate this variable to have a positive sign in the model: Trade
agreements reduce the transaction costs associated with foreign operations, creating
additional competitive advantages for companies headquartered in the signing countries.
Second, host countries' level of urbanization is another variable commonly used in the
FDI literature. Root and Ahmed (1979), for example, found that this variable is highly
significant in explaining FDI flows into developing countries. Thus, I incorporated in the
model the host country' average level of urbanization during the period (urbanpop).
Telecommunications companies operating in more urbanized countries may more easily
reach economies of agglomeration; the level of urbanization may also indicate a
country's rollout of general infrastructure (Reynolds et al., 2006), which may represent
lower operation costs for these companies. I therefore expect this variable to have a
positive sign in the model.
Third, host countries' political and macroeconomic stability should also have a positive
impact on FDI inflows into host countries, since it ameliorates the risks associated with
these operations. Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) found that the stability in the real effective
exchange rate is significant to explain the total inflows of FDI in infrastructure during the
period 1990-2002. Root and Ahmed (1979) found that the number of constitutional
changes is correlated with FDI inflows in developing countries. Bevan and Estrin (2000)
estimated that host country risk, as measured by countries' credit ratings, has been a
significant determinant of FDI inflows into Central and Eastern Europe. Also, Jun and
Singh (1996) found that qualitative indexes of political risk and business conditions are
significant to explain FDI inflows into developing countries during the period 1970-1993.
Considering all this, I included the host countries' relative position in the World Bank's
Doing Business ranking (business) in 2007 as a qualitative proxy for these countries'
political risk and business conditions34
As mentioned, the literature has found that political risk has had a negative impact in the
incoming FDI flows into developing countries; however, in this case, investing countries
are also developing countries whose domestic telecommunications companies may have a
distinct risk perception as well as mechanisms to deal with countries' risk; Buckley et al.
(2007), for example, found international investments of Chinese companies to be
associated with high levels of political risks in host countries. In any case, I assume that
34 The World Bank's Doing Business Index averages the countries' performance on 10 topics associated
with their general business environment: Ease of doing business, starting a business, dealing with
construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying
taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business.
acquisitions of telecommunications companies have been highly affected by investors'
risk perceptions; therefore, I expect low political risk in host countries to have a positive
influence in South-South FDI flows in this sector.
Fourth, maturity of telecommunications markets in home countries should also be a
factor motivating companies to invest abroad, since it may indicate limited growth
potential at home. The World Bank (2006) includes maturing domestic markets as one of
the factors stimulating the rise of South-South FDI in telecoms. In order to control for
this effect, I used the dummy variable rtotpen, which takes the value of 1 if the home
country had a total penetration of both fixed and mobile telecom services larger than the
total penetration in the host country at the beginning of the studied period (1998). I
expect this variable to have a positive sign in the model.
In addition, as I mentioned, the gravity framework includes the distance between
countries as explanatory factor for FDI flows. The World Bank (2006) points out that,
because the cost of gathering relevant information about foreign markets may be high,
emerging telecommunications companies tend to invest in neighboring countries where
they have already reached familiarity due to existing links like trade or culture. In
addition, companies in services sectors -such as telecommunications- often find they
need proximity with their consumers as well as cultural and ethnic familiarity with them
(Aykut and Goldstein, 2006). In this sense, UNDESD (1993), Bevan and Estrin (2000),
Buckley et al. (2007) and Hattari and Rajan (2008) have estimated that either distance or
cultural proximity between host and home economies are significant determinants of FDI
flows in developing countries. Moreover, in the case of telecommunications, Gerpott and
Jakopin (2007) found that cultural distance between home and host countries has had a
negative effect on the market value change of expanding mobile network operators.
Therefore, I included in the model the physical distance between home and host countries
(distance) as a control variable indicating both physical and cultural proximity. I expect
this variable to have a negative effect in FDI flows.
* Regulatory variables
The objective of my thesis is estimating the drivers for the recent internationalization of
telecommunications companies from developing countries, with emphasis on exploring
the role played by governments in such processes. As I mentioned, existing literature
points out that home and host government policies have influenced developing-country
companies' outward FDI decisions: A number of home country governments have
encouraged internationalization through supportive regulations and incentives; also,
liberalization in host countries has created numerous investment opportunities for
expanding companies (UNCTAD, 2006). Regarding telecommunications, as I mentioned,
Kim et al. (2009), Gerpott and Jakopin (2007) and Sarkar et al. (1999) have pointed out
that regulatory environment is one of the main factors affecting companies'
internationalization strategies. In this thesis, therefore, I explore to what extent the
recognized governmental influence in FDI flows also applies to the telecommunications
industry in developing countries.
I included six variables to capture the effects of the reforms implemented in home and
host countries' telecommunications sectors and of the resulting regulatory environments.
The first two variables are associated with the liberalization of telecom markets.
Competition is one of the main drivers for change in these markets: Wallsten (2001)
found that the introduction of competition has been associated significantly with
increases in the coverage of telecom services and with decreases in prices of calls in
developing countries. Similarly, the FDI literature points out that tough competition has
become a push factor that, as long as it limits profit opportunities in home markets, also
motivates the internationalization of local firms (Amighini et al., 2009; UNCTAD, 2006;
World Bank, 2006).
As proxy for competition levels in telecommunications, I included two dummy variables
(compdum) associated with the number of mobile licenses granted in the home and host
markets during the period, respectively. These variables take a value of 1 if the
government granted three or more mobile licenses during the studied period, and 0
otherwise. I choose this definition because empirical studies35 have found that mobile
markets with three or more providers have presented superior levels of competition,
which resulted in larger coverage, higher investment levels and efficient prices.
Based on the existing literature, I expect competition levels in home countries to have a
positive effect on South-South FDI in telecommunications. Competition at home may
constitute a push factor that motivates companies to internationalize as a means to expand
their businesses and to improve their competitiveness. It also may motivate processes of
technological accumulation in local firms, derived from their interaction with
international companies (Lessard and Lucea, 2008). The expected effect of competition
in host-countries is less clear: The presence of multiple telecom providers may mean
more opportunities to enter such markets and it may encourage new investments because
of the larger competition; also, it may mean fewer barriers to entry created by first
movers (Sarkar et al., 1999). Larger competition, however, may also make the purchase
of existing companies less attractive for investors; in this regard, for example, Gerpott
and Jakopin (2007) found that competition in host mobile markets has had a negative
effect on the market value change of expanding mobile network operators. Nevertheless,
new investing companies from developing countries were able to buy telecom providers
at low prices as a consequence of the previous withdrawal of developed-country investors
(World Bank, 2006). Considering this fact, which implies that the negative effect of
competition on investments' attractiveness could have been small, I expect the effect of
host countries competition levels on FDI inflows to be positive.
Another important set of reforms implemented in a number of developing countries has
been the privatization of state-owned telecom providers. In home countries, privatizations
may have incorporated new business practices and managerial mindsets that may have
induced companies to invest abroad -in the cases in which the investors were not yet
multinational companies. Also, family groups purchasing a number of companies may
have helped them to overcome home countries' institutional problems. Similarly,
35 Minges et al. (2008) found that between 2001 and 2006 mobile subscriptions in Sub-Saharan countries
with GDP per capita over US 1.000, have increased by 3% annually with the entry of the second mobile
operator and by 11% annually with the entry of the third mobile operator.
telecoms privatizations in host countries created significant investment opportunities for
foreign companies, as well as new possibilities to learn about emerging markets. Hence, I
included two dummy variables (privdum) for home and host countries that take a value of
1 if these countries privatized their telecommunications incumbents and 0 if they did not.
I expect these variables to have a positive effect in the FDI flows.
The time in which these reforms have been implemented also seems to be relevant to
explain South-South FDI. The World Bank (2006) points out that emerging investors in
telecommunications tend to be from countries that reformed early, given that these
reforms forced companies to become more efficient in advance. In this regard, domestic
companies in countries that privatized early may have incorporated new entrepreneurial
mindsets and efficiency at home. They may also have had a larger likelihood of future
business opportunities abroad. In addition, the may have received, as incumbents, the
benefits of first-mover preemption associated with the potential to influence the home-
country regulatory processes (Kim et al., 2008). In order to capture these effects, I
defined the dummy variable earlypriv, which takes the value of I if the home country
privatized its telecom sector before privatization in the host country, and of 0 otherwise. I
expect this variable to have a positive effect in telecommunications South-South FDI.
In addition, the sequence in which the reforms -liberalization, privatization- were
implemented in home countries may also have had a significant effect in the
internationalization of local companies. In a number of countries privatization was
implemented before complete liberalization as governments granted temporary monopoly
rights to privatized incumbents in certain segments -fixed lines and/or long distance-.
These exclusivity periods in telecommunications may have given first entrants the
opportunity to create further entry barriers even after market liberalizations (Sarkar et al.,
1999). Therefore, I included the dummy variable exclusiv to explore the effect of these
periods in the internationalization of domestic telecom companies. This variable takes the
value of 1 if home governments granted such periods to their incumbent providers and of
0 otherwise. I anticipate this variable to have an overall positive impact: Monopoly
benefits in fixed segments may have allowed domestic incumbents to accumulate the
capital required to venture to invest abroad.
Finally, FDI studies have found that impediments of inward FDI are among the important
factors affecting the location of service activities and that this phenomenon is particularly
true in industries politically or culturally sensitive such as telecommunications
(UNDESD, 1993). Consequently, I added the two variables maxforeign that correspond
to the home and host countries' maximum percentage of foreign ownership in
telecommunication providers36 . In home countries, such restrictions represent entry
barriers for potential foreign competitors; hence this variable's effect in
internationalization should be positive (negative sign). Conversely, such restrictions in
host countries constitute entry barriers for foreign companies and therefore they should
have a negative effect (positive sign) telecom South-South FDI.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 7 presents a statistical description of the variables used in the model, and the table
in Appendix A presents the correlation matrix for the independent variables. Table 7
includes the variables' mean values for the complete set of observations as well as for
two subsets of data associated with each one of the two values of the dummy variablefdi
(0,1). As shown, most of the average values are in line with the premises presented in the
description of the model: Home countries have larger size and GDP per capita than host
countries and their economies are likely to be more open; in addition, pairs of countries
with FDI flows have a larger frequency of trade agreements, and they are likely to be at a
closer in distance. However, some average values are different from expected: The
fraction of home countries growing at a higher rate than host countries is lower for the
subset of countries with FDI flows; in addition, host countries receiving FDI in telecoms
have lower average levels of urbanization and worst business conditions than countries
with no FDI inflows. Regarding the main (regulatory) variables, as shown in the Table, a
36 In the analysis I consider the existing restrictions for fixed operators because some countries (e.g.
Mexico) have defined differential constrains to foreign ownership depending on the type of
telecommunications providers.
larger fraction of home countries have introduced the main telecommunications reforms -
privatization, competition- in comparison to host countries, although home countries also
have higher average levels of restrictions to foreign ownership. In addition, countries
generating FDI have higher frequencies of early privatizations and exclusivity periods
than countries with no outward FDI in telecommunications.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
Mean byfdi Std.
Variable Units Obs. Mean (dummy) Dev. Min Max
O 1
Depend. variables
fdi (dummy) - 402 0.32 0 1 0.47 0 1
fdi (values) $ Mill. 402 138.9 0 439.6 818.4 0 14,571.5
Control variables
pop (home) Mill. 399 140.1 121.1 180.8 321.2 0.08 1,241.9
pop (host) Mill. 390 45.53 46.0 44.6 143.7 0.08 1,241.9
gdpc (home) $ 399 2,293.8 2,097.4 2,714.4 1,739.8 128.2 8,280.7
gdpc (host) $ 390 1,243.0 1,306.7 1,104.8 1,682.6 128.2 8,280.7
rgdpgrow (home) - 402 0.72 0.77 0.61 0.45 0 1
openness (home) % 400 37.51 37.13 38.33 24.37 8.45 116.80
openness (host) % 396 33.69 33.90 33.25 18.15 8.45 116.80
tradedum - 402 0.19 0.08 0.43 0.39 0 1
urbanpop (host) % 396 44.13 44.91 42.44 20.15 8.92 91.63
business (host) - 394 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.24 0 0.93
rtotpen (home) - 402 0.73 0.67 0.86 0.45 0 1
distance Miles 399 3,913.6 4,774.1 2,070.6 2,426.2 18.0 11,061.0
Main variables
compdum (home) - 402 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.43 0 1
compdum (host) - 401 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.47 0 1
privdum (home) - 401 0.42 0.39 0.46 0.49 0 1
privdum (host) - 399 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.48 0 1
earlypriv (home) - 398 0.54 0.50 0.61 0.50 0 1
exclusiv (home) - 396 0.57 0.53 0.65 0.50 0 1
maxforeign (home) - 393 0.70 0.74 0.64 0.28 0 1
maxforeign (host) - 379 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.22 0 1
4. Results
As I mentioned, I estimated two alternative econometric models, Logit and Tobit, on the
country-level determinants of the wave of South-South FDI in telecommunications. The
dependent variable in the Logit model is dummy and it is associated with the existence of
positive FDI flows between home and host countries during the analyzed period. The
dependent variable in the Tobit model is continuous and represents the total FDI flows
between countries. In this regard, the Logit Model results may be interpreted as the
factors explaining the probability of entry of home-country companies into host markets
whereas the Tobit model results are also associated with companies' sustainability in the
host markets along the period.
Since I defined three different variables associated with privatization reforms (privdum
home, privdum host and earlypriv), I combined these variables in different equations to
check the results' consistency. Therefore, in each model I estimated three alternative
equations: The first equation includes the two variables privdum, the second contains the
variable earlypriv, and the third one includes these three variables at the same time.
Tables 8 and 9 present separately the estimation results for each of the resulting six
equations.
Table 8: Regression Results - Logit Model
Probability of FDI in telecommunications from home countries to host countries
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
0.0026 (3.38)*** 0.0027 (3.40)*** 0.0026 (3.36)***Population
(home)
Population
(host)
GDP per capita
(home)
GDP per capita
(host)
Rel. GDP growth
(home, host)
Openess
(home)
Openess
(host)
Trade agreement
(home, host)
Urban population
(host)
Business
conditions (host)
Telecom penet.
(home)
Distance
(home, host)
Competition
(home)
Competition
(host)
Privatization
(home)
Privatization
(host)
Early privatization
(home, host)
Exclusivity period
(home)
Max. foreign
ownership (home)
Max. foreign
ownership (host)
Constant
# Observations
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
-0.0001 (-0.05)
0.0003 (2.00)**
0.0003 (2.16)**
-1.2303 (-2.97)***
0.0013 (0.14)
-0.0202 (-2.08)**
0.8684 (1.94)*
-0.0026 (-0.22)
-1.5218 (-1.65)*
1.1548 (2.03)**
-0.0009 (-6.77)***
1.0144 (2.16)**
0.5023 (1.31)
-0.0839 (-0.19)
0.5250 (1.24)
0.6912 (1.63)*
-1.9436 (-2.32)**
0.2456 (0.25)
1.5318 (0.98)
345
95.16
0.4783
-0.4055 (-0.90)
0.9168 (1.95)*
-1.8112 (-2.28)**
0.5375 (0.56)
1.3281 (0.84)
345
87.28
0.4761
0.0002 (0.18)
0.0002 (1.74)*
0.0003 (1.98)**
-1.3024 (-3.07)***
0.0003 (0.03)
-0.0183 (-1.92)*
0.9606 (2.14)**
-0.0032 (-0.27)
-1.6746 (-1.75)*
1.1634 (2.00)**
-0.0009 (-6.95)***
0.9810 (2.00)**
0.5451 (1.38)
345
95.59
0.4792
Notes: z-statistics associated with robust standard errors, are presented in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
0.0002 (0.21)
0.0002 (1.80)*
0.0003 (1.83)*
-1.2803 (-3.01)***
0.0009 (0.09)
-0.0189 (-1.95)*
0.9553 (2.12)**
-0.0019 (-0.16)
-1.6667 (-1.75)*
1.1503 (1.99)**
-0.0009 (-6.86)***
1.0764 (2.15)**
0.5267 (1.33)
-0.0604 (-0.13)
0.4739 (1.09)
-0.2976 (-0.64)
0.8286 (1.68)*
-1.8674 (-2.20)**
0.2830 (0.28)
1.4302 (0.90)
Table 9: Regression Results - Tobit Model
FDI flows in telecommunications from home countries to host countries
Population
(home)
Population
(host)
GDP per capita
(home)
GDP per capita
(host)
Rel. GDP growth
(home, host)
Openess
(home)
Openess
(host)
Trade agreement
(home, host)
Urban population
(host)
Business
conditions (host)
Telecom penet.
(home)
Distance
(home, host)
Competition
(home)
Competition
(host)
Privatization
(home)
Privatization
(host)
Early privatization
(home, host)
Exclusivity period
(home)
Max. foreign
ownership (home)
Max. foreign
ownership (host)
Constant
# Observations
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
342.31
-950.28
537.77
-670.66
(204.12)*
(519.30)*
(529.33)
(773.63)
345
29.02
0.0632
Equation 2
1.38 (0.627)**
Equation 1
1.42 (0.628)**
1.17 (0.719)*
0.25 (0.139)*
0.21 (0.108)**
-569.76 (273.81)**
-2.28 (4.485)
-24.24 (11.975)**
590.28 (375.43)
12.33 (8.238)
1251.18 (938.29)
283.19 (314.25)
-0.47 (0.153)***
761.63 (366.03)**
316.80 (195.21)*
-276.86 (231.73)
302.75 (255.83)
1.01
0.22
0.23
-538.10
-0.28
-24.89
557.29
12.16
-1135.51
254.00
-0.47
605.89
319.43
-19.39
287.13
-1029.94
655.01
-567.05
345
27.18
0.0623
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
(0.650)
(0.133)*
(0.124)*
(257.78)**
(4.013)
(12.322)**
(357.42)
(7.888)
(886.25)
(319.03)
(0.152)***
(292.84)**
(193.79)*
(249.53)
(241.03)
(516.34)**
(571.21)
(793.27)
Equation 3
1.42 (0.621)**
1.16 (0.706)*
0.25 (0.136)*
0.22 (0.114)*
-571.99 (275.95)**
-2.42 (4.567)
-24.13 (11.814)**
589.40 (373.65)
12.11 (7.918)
1248.98 (933.72)
286.71 (311.03)
-0.47 (0.150)***
738.53 (339.09)**
318.21 (196.24)*
-281.92 (237.47)
311.26 (270.38)
63.26 (272.09)
315.24 (227.0)
-964.69 (538.43)*
524.80 (531.57)
-646.16 (781.18)
345
29.73
0.0632
As shown in Tables 8 and 9, the results for the six equations are consistent among them
and most of the variables display the expected sign. All the estimations fulfill standard
tests of non-existence of specification error 37 and multicollinearity 38; in addition, standard
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Starting by the control variables, in each of the six equations home country population is
positively correlated with FDI flows in telecommunications. This result indicates that the
size of home markets is a predictor of outward FDI in this sector, supporting the premise
that economies of scale facilitate the international expansion of domestic companies.
Likewise, the GDP per capita in the home country also appears as a positive determinant
in the six equations. This result, which is consistent with the IDP model, implies that
economic development is a positive determinant of this type of FDI. Regarding the size
of host markets, GDP per capita is statistically significant in the six equations whereas
country population is significant in two Tobit equations. This indicates that host markets'
economic potential, as given by both the population's purchase power and economy size,
is a major driver of South-South FDI.
In addition, relative GDP growth in home countries is significant in the six equations,
although its sign is negative; that is, home developing countries tend to invest in
telecommunications in faster-growing countries. This result is consistent with Root and
Ahmed (1979), Jun and Singh (1996) and Reynolds et al. (2004); it suggest that host
market potential -as inferred by country's growth rate-, is a significant factor explaining
South-South FDI in this sector.
I also found that the openness of the economies, as given by their levels of exports, is a
significant factor explaining FDI, although only in the case of host countries. For home
37 I utilized the STATA command linktest to detect specification error in the six equations presented in
Tables 8 and 9. This test uses both the regression linear-predicted value and the linear-predicted value
squared as predictors in a new regression model (Source: UCLA, Academic Technology Services, web site:
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata). In the six estimations, the linear-predicted value is significant whereas
the linear predicted value squared is insignificant. Therefore, this test did not detect a specification error in
the equations.
countries, this result means that telecommunication industries' investments abroad are
not aligned with the countries' general outward orientations. In the case of host countries,
the exports variable is significant the six equations and, contrary to what I expected, it is
negatively signed 39. My interpretation is that emerging telecommunications companies
tend to invest in relatively closed economies, where they may expect lower levels of
foreign competition. I also found in the three Logit equations that the preferential
agreements variable is significant and positive. This suggests that, regardless of the
limited openness of the host economies, home and host countries reducing mutually their
entry barriers through such agreements create favorable conditions for the entry of home-
country telecommunications companies.
The control variable indicating urban population in host countries is insignificant in the
six equations; therefore, there is no evidence to argue that emerging investors in
telecommunications prefer to invest in urbanized countries. This suggests that emerging
telecom companies may have mechanisms to deal with host countries' dispersion of
population and with the commonly associated deficits of basic infrastructure.
Additionally, I obtained that political risk and business conditions in host countries are
negatively correlated with FDI in the three Logit equations. This result, consistent with
Buckley et al. (2007), is contrary to what I expected; it indicates that emerging investors
in telecommunications may have developed certain level of risk propensity as a result of
their greater familiarity with emerging market conditions.
I also found in the Logit model's three equations that the variable associated with the
relative telecommunications penetration in home countries is significant and positively
related to FDI flows. This result supports the premise that telecom companies operating
in mature markets tend to look for business opportunities abroad; this finding is
consistent as well with the above-discussed result that these investors look abroad for
markets with high growth potential.
38 To test multicollinearity in the model, first I calculated the correlation matrix presented in the Appendix
A; as shown, none of the sets of variables present high levels of collinearity. In addition, I utilized the
STATA command collin to detect multicollinearity and the results were negative.
In addition, the distance variable resulted highly significant and negative signed in the six
equations, confirming that the intensity of South-South investments in this sector tends to
decrease with the distance between home and host countries. This finding is coherent
with the FDI literature and with the above-described regional nature of this type of
investment; it also indicates that transaction costs and cultural proximity to customers
continue to be relevant factors for telecommunications providers in developing countries.
Regarding the results for the regulatory variables, as I expected, the levels of competition
in home markets are a significant factor motivating South-South FDI. As I argue below,
this result indicates that competition is a push factor encouraging the internationalization
of emerging telecommunications companies. I also found that competition level in host
countries is relevant to explain this type of FDI, although only in the Tobit equations. As
I mentioned, host competition may have two contrary effects on FDI in
telecommunications -the more competition, the more businesses opportunities and the
more incentives to invest in order to gain market share, but the less expected return from
investments-; the positive sign of this variable as well as the fact that it is significant only
in the Tobit equations, may imply that host competition creates strong incentives to invest
once the companies are operating in the host countries.
I also obtained that none of the alternative privatization variables is a significant
determinant of South-South FDI. This outcome may be explained by the fact that both
public and private telecommunications companies from home countries have become
multinationals. In the case of host countries, this result may also reflect the fact that
privatization of national incumbents has been only one of the multiple investment
opportunities that have existed in these markets, which have also included the possibility
of purchasing fixed or mobile telecommunications licenses. Likewise, I found that early
privatization in the home countries does not have a significant effect on South-South FDI
either; in this sense, rather than early reforms, probably the main factor encouraging
39 This result is consistent with Ghura and Goodwin (2000) and Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) who also found a
negative relationship between openness and incoming FDI in developing countries.
efficiency in domestic companies has been the intensity of competition. In the same
regard, the effect of first mover-preemption at home for certain domestic companies is
probably captured in the model by the variable associated with exclusivity periods in
fixed segments.
The exclusivity-periods variable resulted statically significant and positively signed in the
three Logit equations and in one Tobit equation. As I explain below, this result may
indicate that, although competition from mobile providers has been the main driver for
internationalization, a number of privatized incumbents with such exclusivities developed
certain advantages from their protected segments, which they then utilized to compete in
foreign markets.
Finally, I found in the six equations that foreign ownership regulation in the home
countries is a significant determinant of South-South FDI flows. The negative sign of this
variable indicates that home countries defining restrictions on foreign ownership in
telecommunications companies have been more prone to generate outward FDI into other
developing countries. I also found that restrictions on foreign ownership in host countries
are not significant to explain South-South FDI flows; that is, developing country
multinationals tend to invest in host markets regardless of the control they may have in
the acquired companies; this suggests that controlling foreign operations may be not as
important for these companies as generating profits while accumulating scale and
international presence40 , and getting opportunities to learn about foreign markets. This
result also suggests that foreign ownership restrictions have been effective mainly in
protecting local telecommunications companies from the competition of developed-
country multinationals.
40 Kim et al. (2008), for example, describe the experience of Hutchison Whampoa from Hong Kong
(China) entering the Vietnamese market. Given the strict regulations on foreign investments in Vietnam,
this company had to sign a bilateral contract with a local partner, in which Hutchison Whampoa receives no
equity participation for its investments, but a share of the operating profits. The authors argue that the
company's ultimate goal is to establish an international presence and to create business synergies in the
East-Asian market.
5. Analysis
In this chapter I analyze the econometric results in the context of the research objectives I
stated in Chapter 3. Also, I complement the analysis by mentioning specific
internationalization experiences of companies from developing countries. My analysis is
based on the recent theoretical developments in the internationalization of companies
from developing countries. Especially, I consider the framework proposed by Lessard
and Lucea (2008), which I described in Chapter 2. This model argues that emerging
multinational companies achieve sustained success through the development of capacity
platforms resulting from the interaction between home country and firm specific
advantages. These companies also need to adapt and renew their capability platforms
through the exploitation of the resources and knowledge accumulated from foreign
operations.
Nevertheless, it is relevant to mention that in line with the scope of this thesis, my
analysis is limited to those FDI drivers that can be estimated at the country level. As I
mentioned, the literature has found that emerging companies are likely to rely on home
country-specific advantages in their early stages of internationalization. Nevertheless,
besides country-level drivers, other factors at either the industry or the firm level may
also affect emerging companies' internationalization decisions. For example, as I
mentioned in Chapter 2, Sarkar et al. (1999) state a number of strategic considerations at
industry level that motivate telecommunications companies to look for new markets
abroad. These considerations include: 1) The strategic interdependence of global
telecommunications markets, which implies that companies' competitive position in one
market may be affected by their position in other national markets; 2) internationalization
pressures from major customers, which encourages cross-national linkages and presence;
and 3) systemic ownership advantages developed through international presence, such as
access to international financial markets as well as the ability to influence standard-
setting institutions. Also, from the Latin American experience, Mariscal and Rivera
(2005) point out that those companies that competed in the fixed telephone segment were
able to consolidate strong competitive positions in home countries. Similarly, factors at
the firm level like corporate governance or strong leadership may have played important
additional roles in the internationalization of domestic telecommunications companies.
Table 10 summarizes the analysis I present in this chapter; it shows the proposed
categorization of the country-level drivers of international expansion of emerging
telecommunications companies. As shown, I classify these drivers into country-level
firms' sources of competitive advantage and countries' factors of internationalization.
Table 10: Drivers of telecommunications South-South FDI at country level
Home Countries Host Countries
Scale of operations Proximity
Sources of Knowledge of emerging markets Political risk/business conditions
Advantage Limited exposure to full liberalization Favored market access
Push/Pull Market maturity Growth potential
factors Increasing competitive pressures
5.1 Initial advantages and push factors in the home countries
Regarding the first research question of my thesis, a number of factors in the home
countries are the primary explanation for the emergence of multinational
telecommunications companies in developing economies. The first factor (source of
advantage) for a number of firms is their scale of operations; I infer the relevance of this
factor from the significance in the model of both the size of the home economy and the
home market's relative penetration of telecommunications services. Large
telecommunications companies in developing countries, therefore, may develop
competitive advantages -associated with their lower average expenditures- that can be
leveraged in the foreign markets. These companies' cost advantages may arise from their
lower average expenses of building networks and managing traffic (Kim et al., 2008).
They are also related to the economies derived from marketing activities and financial
expenditures. An example is the case of Orascom from Egypt, which has been able to
leverage brand name recognition, technologies and financial resources to operate in
developing-country markets where local players are often weak competitors (Goldstein,
2007).
However, smaller companies also seem to have reasons to pursue foreign operations, as a
means to achieve size; as I mentioned, a number of small and medium sized companies
have expanded into nearby countries, with the probable objective of reaching a minimum
scale of operations. For example, in 2007 Globalcom from Nigeria won a mobile license
in neighboring Benin and in the same year the company had further expansion plans into
Morocco, The Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Ghana41. Similarly, by 2007 Sonatel from
Senegal operated in three nearby countries: Mali, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau42 . Other
examples of a small companies becoming multinationals are MT from Morocco that
expanded into Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Gabon, and Sudatel from Sudan, which has
operations in Mauritania, Senegal and Nigeria43 .
A second source of competitive advantage for emerging telecommunications companies
is their superior knowledge of emerging market conditions. As I explain below, I infer
this driver from the significance in the model of both the distance between home and host
countries, and of the host countries' market conditions. This advantage is developed at
home and then it is exploited and enhanced through the companies' foreign operations in
other developing countries.
A third source of competitive advantage for a number of domestic telecommunications
companies seem to be their limited exposure tofull market liberalization. As I mentioned,
41 Source: Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., "Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband in Africa", 2008.
42 Sonatel is 57% owned by the government and private domestic investors, and 43% by France Telecom.
Source: Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., "Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband in Africa", 2008.
43 Source: Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., "Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband in Africa", 2008.
the two variables associated with these limitations -restrictions on foreign ownership and
exclusivity periods in fixed segments- turned out to be significant predictors of
telecommunications South-South FDI.
Limitations on foreign ownership may have created advantages for domestic providers
since, as a result of these restrictions, potential foreign competitors have either abstained
from entering these markets, or needed to operate, under a minority-stake condition, in
conjunction with a local partner. Also, domestic investors in countries with these
constrains surely had better chances to purchase privatized state-owned companies.
Similarly, exclusivity periods in countries with foreign ownership restrictions may have
created advantages for incumbents -probably controlled by domestic investors-, since
these periods enabled them to accumulate profits that then they have used to invest
abroad. The fact of being the first private movers in certain segments at home may have
also allowed a number of domestic incumbents to preempt their home markets by
creating additional entry barriers to competitors; these additional barriers may have
included delays in new licenses' processes, impediments to interconnection, key
customers lock-in and cross-subsidies among different services (Ramamurti, 2000).
Examples of domestic incumbents protected from full liberalization are Telmex from
Mexico and Telekom Malaysia. Mexico has kept a foreign ownership restriction of 49%
for fixed-line operators. Accordingly, Telmex was purchased in 1990 by an international
consortium led by the Mexican financial conglomerate Grupo Carso. This company
received monopoly rights in the long-distance sector until 1997, when this market was
opened to competition; in addition, when the cellular market was initiated in 1987, this
company was granted the only nation-wide mobile license (Mariscal and Rivera, 2005).
Likewise, Telekom Malaysia, the major player in the Malaysian telecommunications
market, was partly privatized in 1990, with the government retaining 77% of the stakes -
the foreign ownership restriction 44 in Malaysia is 30%-; this company has been partially
44 Source: World Bank (2006).
protected since the government has allowed competition in all the telecom markets,
except in basic services 45
Additionally, besides the sources of advantage in home markets, two "push-factors" in
home countries seem to have a special role in motivating a number of companies to
exploit their existing advantages abroad. The first factor is the increasing competitive
pressures at home -as measured by the level of competition in mobile markets-; that is,
the threat of losing market participation at home seems to be a primary factor that
motivates these companies to look for foreign markets. In South Africa, for example,
telecoms markets have been characterized by tough competition among a few large firms
that became dominant under apartheid. In this context, Vodacom initially dominated
MTN in the home market, which encouraged MTN to invest aggressively in regional
expansion (Goldstein and Prichard, 2009).
The second factor is the relative maturity of the telecommunications markets in the home
countries. In an international-oriented industry such as telecommunications, companies
operating in mature markets tend to look for business opportunities abroad. In addition,
these companies tend to look for emerging markets with high growth potential. An
example of market maturity's relevance is the case of South Africa whose
telecommunications markets are relatively mature; consequently, South African
companies have expanded into countries with higher growth potential, some of them
located in Sub-Saharan Africa 46 . Similarly, facing the maturity of Turkey's mobile
market 47, Turkcell has expanded internationally into various former-soviet-union
countries 48
45 Source: Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., "Malaysia - Key Statistics, Telecommunications
Overview and Major Players", 2008.
46 In 2007 the mobile penetration in South Africa was 89% whereas the average penetration in host
countries in SSA was 23%. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
47 In 2007, Turkey had 83.9 mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants. Source: World Bank, World
Development Indicators.
48 Source: Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., "Turkey - Mobile Market - Overview & Statistics",
2008.
5.2 Transferability of advantages and pull factors in the host countries
Emerging companies' internationalization also depend on the business opportunities
generated by the potential-host countries, as well as on particular conditions in these
countries that allow companies to exploit, in a sustainable fashion, their competitive
advantages. Therefore, emerging companies need to locate their foreign operations in
host countries in which they are able to transfer their advantages and appropriate the
benefits from their exploitation.
The estimation results suggest that four drivers associated with the host markets are
especially relevant. The first driver is the host country's proximity from home, which
may represent a source of advantage in relation to other international competitors. A short
physical, cultural or administrative distance between home and host countries indicates
lower transaction costs 49 from foreign operations; it is also associated with a greater
similarity between domestic and foreign markets. In this regard, telecommunications
markets located in closer countries allow emerging companies to transfer and exploit
their understanding of emerging market conditions, including distinctive institutions and
customer profiles. Operations in nearby countries also enable telecommunications
companies to benefit from scale economies and from the synergies associated with joint
network operations50 . There are a variety of examples of companies that have developed
advantages by locating their foreign operations in neighboring countries. Russian firms
like MTS and VimpelCom have expanded into former-soviet countries, by buying out
local operators and consolidating the domestic industry (MacCarthy et al., 2009). MTN
from South Africa began investing in African markets before exploring other regions like
the Middle East (Ramamurti, 2008). Group Telmex first acquired privatized fixed
companies in Central America and then expanded its mobile operation into various
countries in South America 51 . Likewise, Orascom and Turkcell have invested primarily
49 For example, travel time, travel frequency and communications difficulties due to time shifts between
working hours (Gerpott and Jakopin, 2007).
50 For example, the number of communications between subscribes in neighboring countries may be larger
than between distant countries; this proximity allows companies to attract customers with special "on-net"
tariffs and to generate additional revenues (Gerpott and Jakopin, 2007).
51 Source: Mariscal and Rivera (2005).
within their own regions and Telekom Malaysia, after expanding to Sub-Saharan Africa,
has decided to keep only its investments in countries close to Malaysia 52
The second source of advantage is the host country's political risk and business
conditions. The results suggest that emerging companies tend to enter developing
countries with less developed institutions, reflecting certain level of risk propensity.
Therefore, countries with deficient business conditions also represent an opportunity for
these companies to exploit their superior knowledge of developing-market conditions,
such as customers' profiles and regulatory systems. Egypt's Orascom, for example, by
2006 was the only foreign telecommunications company operating in Iraq (Aykut and
Goldstein, 2006) 53. Likewise, UNCTAD (2004) points out that some of Africa's smaller
and riskier markets have attracted emerging multinational companies; it mentions the
examples of the Lebanese Investcom operating in Burundi, Congo, Ghana, Guinea and
Liberia, and Telkom Malaysia providing mobile services in Guinea.
The relevance of the institutional factor in host countries may also reflect that, as
latecomers in these countries, emerging companies' main business opportunities abroad
have been the purchase of operations in markets where other companies -probably from
developed countries have failed. From this interpretation, I infer what can be a relevant
difference between the sources of advantage of developed and developing-country
multinationals in telecommunications: Whereas various developed-country companies
gained early-mover advantages from host markets' preemption (Sarkar et al., 1999;
Ramamurti, 2000), emerging multinationals probably developed latecomer advantages in
host markets from the lower price of assets as well as from the accumulated knowledge
of other companies' previous operations.
The combination of distance and institutions as significant drivers of South-South FDI
also indicates the importance for emerging companies of the transferability of the
52 Source: Word Bank (2006).
53 Nevertheless, emerging companies' expansions into developing countries with deficient business
conditions has not been without difficulties; Goldstein (2007) mentions certain problems that Orascom had
with its local partner in Syria, which apparently had close connections with this country's regime.
knowledge accumulated in foreign operations. In this regard, in line with Lessard and
Lucea's model (2008), host countries may represent not only an opportunity to exploit
these companies' understanding of emerging markets but also a chance to enhance their
capabilities. Especially, by operating in foreign developing-country markets, emerging
companies gain a better understanding of customer profiles and of regulatory processes.
This improved knowledge enables them to design better marketing strategies; it also
allows them to have a larger influence on governments' decisions, in order to obtain
additional privileges or licenses for new services.
The experience of MTN from South Africa is an illustrative example of an emerging
company that augmented its capabilities platform by operating in foreign developing
countries. This company started investing in nearby Sub-Saharan countries like Uganda,
Rwanda, Swaziland and Nigeria. In these countries, the company developed innovative
approaches to overcome the institutional deficiencies; for example, it introduced pre-paid
cards to undermine credit risk, plan structures better adapted to local customers and
mobile infrastructure where no previous fixed networks existed. Based on its success in
these countries, MTN then expanded into Middle Eastern markets. (Goldstein and
Prichard, 2009). Similarly, Mexico's America M6vil (Telmex Group) has been successful
in adapting its marketing strategy across Latin America and gaining dominance in these
markets over competitors from the United States and Europe (Aykut and Goldstein,
2006).
A third source of advantage in host countries is the favored market access in the host
countries, in relation to their potential competitors. I infer the relevance of this factor
from the significance in the model of the variables indicating preferential trade
agreements and host countries' economic openness. Trade agreements may reduce
existing entry barriers in host countries while enabling incoming companies to decrease
the transaction costs from their operations; preferential agreements may also allow these
companies to find local partners in an easier manner. I also found that emerging
companies tend to invest in relatively closed economies, where potential foreign
competitors may find additional barriers to entry. Therefore, I infer that emerging
telecom companies look for host countries where they may find favorable policies that
create additional advantages in relation to other international competitors.
In addition, the econometric results indicate that host markets' growth potential is a "pull
factor" for emerging multinational telecommunications companies. I deduce this factor's
relevance from the significance in the model of four variables associated with host
countries: telecommunications penetration, population, income per capita and the host
economy's GDP growth. This factor reflects the market-seeking behavior of emerging
companies, as well as their likely long-term commitment to their foreign operations. Kim
et al. (2008), for example, point out that Hutchison Whampoa from Hong Kong, China,
entered emerging markets54 in developing countries that have high growth potential given
their low penetration rates; this company's strategy has been to generate revenues
through mobile operations and to earn capital gains by rising market values or through
Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of the companies owned in these markets. Likewise,
Curwen and Whalley (2008) argue that African markets have been attractive for Middle
Eastern investors because these markets have been growing faster than those in the
Middle East.
5.3 The effects of government intervention
I now consider only the factors associated with government intervention. As Chapter 2
mentions, telecommunications reforms in developing countries have been complex
processes in which governments have usually been subject to conflicting policy
objectives as a result, in many cases, of the participation of strong groups of interest. In
this context, governments have usually tried to minimize political frictions in order to
make the reforms viable.
54 In 2008, Hutchison Whampoa had operations in the European market, as well as in Israel, Indonesia,
Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Ghana.
The main policy conflict faced by a number of governments has been the apparent
contradiction between, on one hand, incorporating both competition and private capital in
the telecommunications markets and, on the other, promoting the competitiveness of the
national industry, keeping state control over the provision of basic services or obtaining
additional revenues. Most of the countries opted for a model of privatization, tough
competition and minimum government intervention. Other countries, however, took
certain distance from this model; some of them, preserved government participation in
the national companies' ownership while others kept restrictions to foreign ownership in
these companies; some countries also preserved a vertically integrated incumbent. In
addition, aiming to make state-owned companies attractive for private capital, some
countries granted temporary monopoly rights to the privatized incumbents in certain
market segments.
Amid this variety of regulations and reforms, a number of companies developed
distinctive competitive advantages both at home and in the international markets.
According to the econometric results, these government-created sources of advantage
were their limited exposure to full liberalization, in terms of foreign ownership
restrictions or exclusivity periods, as well as the signature of trade agreements with
certain countries. However, the results indicate that another variable controlled by the
government -the levels of competition in the market, has also been a relevant push-factor
of these firms' internationalization.
I deduce, therefore, that governments in developing countries have had an active role in
the internationalization of domestic telecommunications companies in two seemly
contradictory ways: On the one hand, they have created additional sources of advantage
for these firms in both home and international markers; on the other, they have
incorporated levels of competition that have created pressures for these companies'
efficiency and internationalization. As a result, emerging companies facing certain levels
of competition -small enough to keep their operations at home but large enough to be
encouraged to gain efficiency and competitiveness in the international markets- were
more likely to become multinationals. An example is the case of South African
companies that have traditionally faced high levels of competition in the domestic
markets but, at the same time, have been protected from full liberalization since the
government has kept a limit -between 30% and 49%- to foreign ownership in telecom
providers. The coexistence of these two contrasting roles of government, therefore, seems
to be one of the main determinants of the emergence of multinational telecommunications
companies in these countries.
In addition, host governments have also had a role in companies' internationalization.
Not only emerging companies have found attractive business opportunities in host
countries, such as low-priced assets, but also they have probably found special conditions
in terms of lower barriers to entry or lesser administrative costs. Therefore, emerging
multinationals have also benefited from regulatory arbitrage among their home and host
countries; that is, the coincidence of both stringent and favorable regimes of foreign
participation in telecommunications in different countries, seem to have also motivated
the emergence of multinational companies in the countries with the more stringent
regimes.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Since the late 1990s, South-South investment has increased substantially its participation
in the total telecommunications FDI in developing countries. The rise of this type of
investment reflects not only changes in the countries' economic conditions but also the
emergence of a number of domestic telecommunications companies from these countries
that are becoming multinationals and gradually increasing the magnitude of their foreign
operations.
This thesis has explored the country-level drivers of the wave of South-South FDI in
telecommunications and how these drivers have shaped companies' competitive
advantages. Using economic and regulatory information from 145 developing countries,
collected from different sources such as the World Bank's PPI and WDI datasets, I built a
cross-section econometric model to estimate the determinants of this wave of FDI during
the period 1998-2007. I divided these determinants into control variables and regulatory
variables. By including control variables, I attempted to isolate the effect of countries'
economic and other structural variables in FDI flows; I included the regulatory variables
to identify the role that government intervention has played in the rise of this type of
investment.
The results indicate that the emergence and sustainability of multinational
telecommunications companies from developing countries are explained, at the country
level, by distinctive economic and structural characteristics of the home and host
countries that have shaped these companies' special advantages and investment paths in
the international markets. In this context, government intervention in home and host
countries has created particular sources of advantage and business opportunities that have
resulted in additional incentives for these companies' internationalization.
According to the results, emerging multinational companies in this sector tend to
originate in relatively large countries with maturing telecommunications markets. Also,
these companies are more likely to emerge in countries that have incorporated both
competitive forces and certain protection for them from full liberalization. These
companies' operations tend to be located in nearby countries, whose telecommunications
markets exhibit large potential, where barriers to entry are lower in relation to other
foreign competitors, and where they are able to exploit their superior knowledge of
emerging market conditions.
From this picture I infer three main conclusions. First, the relative rarity of the
coexistence of special economic and regulatory conditions in both home and host
countries explains why multinational companies have emerged in only a relatively small
number of developing countries. In order to be competitive abroad, domestic companies
need to reach a certain scale, to face certain sources of pressure such as competition and
market maturity, and, in some cases, to operate under favorable governmental
regulations. They also need to find attractive business opportunities in host markets as
well as special conditions such as proximity, similarity, and low barriers to entry. These
companies, therefore, operate in an industry in which economies of scale, proximity, and
governmental regulation are still fundamental.
My second conclusion is that these companies exhibit distinctive internationalization
drivers in relation to their developed-country competitors. Mainly, they tend to enter
countries that have less favorable business environments. This tendency may be
explained by the fact that a number of emerging companies are latecomers that have
purchased low-priced assets in host markets from which other companies have exited. A
complementary explanation is that these firms look for markets where they can exploit
their superior knowledge of emerging market conditions. Therefore, from their initial
operations in their domestic markets, which include dealing with local governments and
customers and particular infrastructure conditions, these companies gather relevant
knowledge that enables them to adapt better to similar circumstances in host markets. In
addition, these companies also take advantage of their operations in foreign emerging
markets to improve their adaptability to this type of markets. In this regard, for emerging
telecommunications multinationals, foreign operations are also an opportunity to enhance
one of their main global competitive advantages: their adaptability to the special
conditions of developing-country markets.
My third conclusion concerns the role of governments in these companies'
internationalization. Governments in home countries have incorporated signs of
efficiency and an international perspective in their domestic markets by opening them to
foreign competition. In addition, a number of governments have attempted to level the
playing field for their domestic companies vis-a-vis the foreign competitors, while others
aiming to improve the attractiveness of their state-owned incumbents have defined
monopoly conditions in certain market segments for the privatized companies. As a
result, domestic companies' operation in a general competitive environment while having
certain protection either in specific segments or from foreign competitors, along with
other factors, has resulted in these companies' internationalization.
In addition, governments in host countries have played a role in the rise of this wave of
FDI. They have created new business opportunities in their markets and they have
generated favorable conditions, in terms of commercial preferences, for certain emerging
companies in relation to other foreign competitors. These favorable conditions probably
have resulted from the administrative, cultural and political proximity between home and
host countries, and surely some home countries have played a role in negotiating
privileges for their companies abroad. In addition, through their interaction with host-
country governments, some incoming companies may have influenced the policy
processes in order to obtain access to markets or favorable conditions for their operations.
Emerging telecommunications multinationals, therefore, seem to have taken advantage of
favorable regulatory conditions in both home and host markets. In this regard, the
dissimilar levels of liberalization implemented by developing countries in their
telecommunications sectors, specially the coexistence of rigid FDI regimes in home
countries and favorable access conditions in host countries, have created regulatory-
arbitrage opportunities that have facilitated the internationalization of a number of
national telecommunications companies.
From this thesis I derive two policy implications. First, in line with the existing literature,
emerging telecommunications multinationals may be key players in the performance of
this sector in developing countries. Their distinctive profiles in terms of experience,
capabilities, and strategies (including their knowledge acquisition and risk management
practices), may make them important actors for telecommunications growth in less-
developed markets. Accordingly, governments' development strategies in these sectors
should consider the potential role that these companies may play. In addition, these
companies' operation in nearby countries may bring additional benefits for home and
host countries in terms of economies of scale from joint network operations as well as
regional integration. For this reason, developing-country governments should continue
promoting preferential agreements that encourage South-South investments in this sector.
Second, the fact that domestic telecommunications companies in developing countries
exhibit market-seeking behavior, scale concerns and improve their capability platform by
operating abroad could be an argument in favor of policies promoting their
competitiveness and internationalization. However, my intention is not to make a case for
protectionism in the telecommunications sectors since, as I mentioned, the literature has
also found that anti-competitive policies may generate negative effects in terms of
efficiency as well as in the availability and affordability of services. The policy
implication that I derive, therefore, is that developing-country governments need to
design informed reforms and regulations in this sector, taking into consideration all the
possible trade-offs involved in their decisions. An important trade-off involving
competition policies in telecommunications is the one between liberalization of markets
and domestic industry's competitiveness; when designing these policies, therefore,
governments need to be aware that they may generate an outcome that will probably lie
between maximum welfare gains in terms of penetration and affordability of services,
and the chance for domestic telecom industries to become competitive in the international
markets and, in turn, to develop their capability platforms in order to satisfy local and
international demands.
Finally, future work should include a deeper exploration of the firm-level and industry-
level drivers of South-South FDI in telecommunications, as well as of their interaction
with the country-level drivers addressed in this thesis. Specifically, further research could
study the role of emerging firms' cross-border competitive strategies as well as
indigenous characteristics like particular governance structures. Also, to the extent that
sources of information allow complementing the existing data, a panel-data estimation of
the drivers of this type of investment would make it possible to incorporate the time
dimension into the analysis. In addition, future studies could further inform the debate on
the different welfare and development implications of the dissimilar reforms
implemented by developing countries in their telecommunications sectors.
Appendix A: Correlation Matrix
Pop (home) Pop GDPc GDPc Rgdpgrow Openess Openess
(host) (home) (host) (home) (home) (host)
Pop (home) 1
Pop (host) 0.0355 1
GDPc (home) -0.2724 -0.0782 1
GDPc (host) 0.006 -0.0357 0.0194 1
RGDPgr (home) 0.1216 -0.082 -0.1176 0.107 1
Openess (home) -0.1721 0.004 0.1839 -0.0684 0.0317 1
Openess (host) -0.01 -0.1425 -0.0107 0.2462 -0.1331 0.0105 1
Urbanpop (host) -0.0716 -0.0536 0.0367 0.6873 -0.0948 -0.0849 0.2735
rTotpen (home) 0.0051 -0.1052 0.3403 -0.499 -0.1007 0.1906 -0.1578
Compdum (home) -0.3096 -0.0107 0.0801 0.0468 0.0244 0.1319 0.0396
Compdum (host) 0.0121 0.0735 0.0699 0.1823 0.1148 0.0788 0.0017
Maxforeig (home) -0.1971 0.0288 -0.4301 0.0673 -0.171 -0.3279 -0.0131
Maxforeig (host) -0.0098 -0.2209 0.0639 -0.0365 0.1832 -0.0088 -0.1874
Exclusiv (home) -0.325 -0.0155 0.2699 0.079 0.0939 0.2486 0.0289
Earlypriv (home) -0.2989 0.0691 0.2269 -0.1748 0.0227 0.1618 -0.044
Privdum (home) -0.2532 0.0306 0.3683 0.0268 0.0167 -0.2428 -0.0031
Privdum (host) 0.0406 -0.138 0.1007 0.3305 0.1676 0.0155 -0.1116
Distance 0.0184 0.0372 0.0687 0.133 0.1616 0.0527 -0.0634
Tradedum 0.0235 -0.056 0.0687 0.0626 -0.0778 0.0101 0.0588
Business (host) 0.0193 0.0246 0.0531 0.3802 -0.0658 -0.0649 0.3384
Urbanpop Rtotpen Compdum Compdum Maxforeign Maxforeign Exclusiv
(host) (home) (home) (host) (home) (host) (home)
Urbanpop (host) 1
rTotpen (home) -0.3957 1
Compdum (home) 0.1466 0.0359 1
Compdum (host) 0.2012 -0.0648 0.0467 1
Maxforeig (home) 0.0937 -0.2635 0.0072 -0.0732 1
Maxforeig (host) -0.097 0.0247 -0.0447 0.0949 -0.0603 1
Exclusiv (home) 0.0697 0.1033 0.2962 0.0155 -0.2306 0.011 1
Earlypriv (home) -0.0424 0.1496 0.4003 -0.0573 -0.0789 0.0461 0.5845
Privdum (home) 0.0352 0.084 0.2672 -0.0272 0.0403 -0.0413 0.3915
Privdum (host) 0.1891 -0.1226 -0.0606 0.0745 -0.005 0.2302 0.0537
Distance 0.1042 -0.0355 0.0607 0.0773 -0.058 0.0049 0.1016
Tradedum 0.0191 -0.011 0.0094 -0.0175 -0.0819 -0.0474 0.079
Business (host) 0.4062 -0.3369 0.0129 0.0363 -0.0036 -0.1192 -0.0936
Earlypriv Privdum Privdum Distance Tradedum Business
(home) (home) (host) (host)
1
Privdum (home)
Privdum (host)
Distance
Tradedum
Business (host)
0.387
-0.1727
0.0056
0.0606
-0.1566
1
0.0326
0.1117
0.0033
0.0174
1
0.0889
-0.058
0.1356
1
-0.4886
0.0631
1
0.0364
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